Special Issue: Summit Agreements

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

Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird (left), with Navy Admiral Thomas H. Moorer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, discusses the second round of Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) with media representatives at a July 24 Washington news conference. (Wide World Photo)

President Nixon's Three Pillars of Peace

The agreements between the Soviet Union and the United States which climaxed President Nixon's recent visit to Moscow are impressive testimony to the efficacy of the Nixon Doctrine. These dramatic achievements—tangible evidence of this Administration's willingness to negotiate—were made possible by our insistence upon maintaining a position of strength in world affairs and our continued encouragement for a wider partnership among nations. These fundamental precepts of the Nixon Doctrine are derived from the three pillars of the President's Strategy for Peace—the Strength and Partnership Pillars, which in turn provide the foundations for the third pillar, the Willingness to Negotiate.

I have presented to the Congress my endorsement of these arms limitation agreements. I also emphasized to the Congress my views that national security cannot be bought cheaply and that the potential benefits of these agreements could be nullified by an inadequate Defense budget. Ultimate peace—the continued goal of this Administration—depends on our ability to sustain a position of strength.

This issue of the COMMANDER'S DIGEST serves the special purpose of providing to the military community an accessible accumulation of the documents most pertinent to the recent arms limitation agreements. I urge the careful study of this documentation by each person having a continued interest in the national security of the United States.

Melvin R. Laird

Secretary of Defense

BASIC PRINCIPLES OF MUTUAL RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,

Guided by their obligations under the Charter of the United Nations and by a desire to strengthen peaceful relations with each other and to place these relations on the firmest possible basis,

Aware of the need to make every effort to remove the threat of war and to create conditions which promote the reduction of tensions in the world and the strengthening of universal security and international cooperation,

Believing that the improvement of US-Soviet relations and their mutually advantageous development in such areas as economics, science and culture, will meet these objectives and contribute to better mutual understanding and business-like cooperation, without in any way prejudicing the interests of third countries,

Conscious that these objectives reflect the interests of the peoples of both countries,

Have agreed as follows:

First. They will proceed from the common determination that in the nuclear age there is no alternative to conducting their mutual relations on the basis of peaceful coexistence. Differences in ideology and in the social systems of the USA and the USSR are not obstacles to the bilateral development of normal relations based on the principles of sovereignty, equality, non-interference in internal affairs and mutual advantage.

Second. The USA and the USSR attach major importance to preventing the development of situations capable of causing a dangerous exacerbation of their relations. Therefore, they will do their utmost to avoid military confrontations and to prevent the outbreak of nuclear war. They will always exercise restraint in their mutual relations, and will be prepared to negotiate and settle differences by peaceful means. Discussions and negotiations on outstanding issues will be conducted in a spirit of reciprocity, mutual accommodation and mutual benefit.

Both Sides recognize that efforts to obtain unilateral advantages at the expense of the other, directly or indirectly, are inconsistent with these objectives. The prerequisites for maintaining and strengthening peaceful relations between the USA and the USSR are the recognition of the security interests of the Parties based on the principle of equality and the renunciation of the use or threat of force.

Third. The USA and the USSR have a special responsibility, as do other countries which are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, to do everything in their power so that conflicts or situations will not arise which would serve to increase international tensions. Accordingly, they will seek to promote conditions in which all countries will live in peace and security and will not be subject to outside interference in their internal affairs.

Fourth. The USA and the USSR intend to widen the juridical basis of their mutual relations and to exert the necessary efforts so that bilateral agreements which they have concluded and multilateral treaties and agreements to which they are jointly parties are faithfully implemented.

The United States and the Soviet Union: Potentials for Peace

President Nixon has repeatedly emphasized his hope of bringing about a basic change in our relations with the U.S.S.R.—a change from confrontation to negotiation. If a generation of peace is to be realized, nothing is more important than the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union.

There are profound differences and disagreements between us and the Soviet Union which cannot simply be ascribed to historical accidents or misunderstandings. They are rooted in different conceptions of the rights and responsibilities of men and of governments. They are rooted in different approaches in dealing with other nations. They manifest themselves in conflicting interests in different regions of the world.

Accordingly, we cannot eliminate overnight the profound differences that separate us. We and the Soviets are now and will remain for some time, if not adversaries, then at least political-military opponents with different global policies. Unless we accept these strategic and political realities and make this recognition the starting point for our efforts toward peace, we diminish the chances to achieve peace and increase the risks to our own basic interests.

I believe great nations today can be peaceful adversaries without being belligerent antagonists.

The true question confronting us is not whether it is possible to have instant revolution in our relations with the Soviet Union. The question instead is whether we can manage our relationship so that we resolve what can be resolved and control what cannot.

That is what the President's Strategy for Peace is all about.

Editor's Note: These observations are excerpts from an address by Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird before the Cincinnati Council on World Affairs, March 10, 1972.

Fifth. The USA and the USSR reaffirm their readiness to continue the practice of exchanging views on problems of mutual interest and, when necessary, to conduct such exchanges at the highest level, including meetings between leaders of the two countries.

The two governments welcome and will facilitate an increase in productive contacts between representatives of the legislative bodies of the two countries.

Sixth. The Parties will continue their efforts to limit armaments on a bilateral as well as on a multilateral basis. They will continue to make special efforts to limit strategic armaments. Whenever possible, they will conclude concrete agreements aimed at achieving these purposes.

The USA and the USSR regard as the ultimate objective of their efforts the achievement of general and complete disarmament and the establishment of an effective system of international security in accordance with the purposes and principles of the United Nations.

Seventh. The USA and the USSR regard commercial and economic ties as an important and necessary element in the strengthening of their bilateral relations and thus will actively promote the growth of such ties. They will facilitate cooperation between the relevant organizations and enterprises of the two countries and the conclusion of appropriate agreements and contracts, including long-term ones.

The two countries will contribute to the improvement of maritime and air communications between them.

Eighth. The two sides consider it timely and useful to develop mutual contacts and cooperation in the fields of science and technology. Where suitable, the USA and the USSR will conclude appropriate agreements dealing with concrete cooperation in these fields.

Ninth. The two sides reaffirm their intention to deepen cultural ties with one another and to encourage fuller familiarization with each other's cultural values. They will promote improved conditions for cultural exchanges and tourism.

Tenth. The USA and the USSR will seek to ensure that their ties and cooperation in all the above-mentioned fields and in any others in their mutual interest are built on a firm and long-term basis. To give a permanent character to these efforts, they will establish in all fields where this is feasible joint commissions or other joint bodies.

Eleventh. The USA and the USSR make no claim for themselves and would not recognize the claims of anyone else to any special rights or advantages in world affairs. They recognize the sovereign equality of all states.

The Development of US-Soviet relations is not directed against third countries and their interests.

Twelfth. The basic principles set forth in this document do not affect any obligations with respect to other countries earlier assumed by the USA and the USSR.

Moscow, May 29, 1972

For the United States of America
RICHARD NIXON
President of the United States
of America

For the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics
LEONID I. BREZHNEV
General Secretary of the
Central Committee, CPSU



SEATED AT A TABLE in Moscow, President Richard Nixon (left) and Soviet General Secretary of the Central Committee Leonid Brezhnev, affix their signatures to one of several agreements that were concluded during Mr. Nixon's May visit to the Soviet Union.
(Official White House Photo)

JOINT U.S.—SOVIET COMMUNIQUE

By mutual agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the President of the United States and Mrs. Richard Nixon paid an official visit to the Soviet Union from May 22 to May 30, 1972. The President was accompanied by Secretary of State William P. Rogers, Assistant to the President Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, and other American officials. During his stay in the USSR President Nixon visited, in addition to Moscow, the cities of Leningrad and Kiev.

President Nixon and L. I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, N. V. Podgorny, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and A. N. Kosygin, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, conducted talks on fundamental problems of American-Soviet relations and the current international situation.

Also taking part in the conversations were:

On the American side: William P. Rogers, Secretary of State; Jacob D. Beam, American Ambassador to the USSR; Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; Peter M. Flanigan, Assistant to the President; and Martin J. Hillenbrand, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs.

On the Soviet side: A. A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR; N. S. Patolichev, Minister of Foreign Trade; V. V. Kuznetsov, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR; A. F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador to the USA; A. M. Aleksandrov, Assistant to the General Secretary of the Central Committee, CPSU; G. M. Korniyenko, Member of the Collegium of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR.

The discussions covered a wide range of questions of mutual interest and were frank and thorough. They defined more precisely those areas where there are prospects for developing greater cooperation between the two countries, as well as those areas where the positions of the two Sides are different.

I. BILATERAL RELATIONS

Guided by the desire to place US-Soviet relations on a more stable and constructive foundation, and mindful of their responsibilities for maintaining world peace and for facilitating the relaxation of international tension, the two Sides adopted a document entitled: "Basic Principles of Mutual Relations between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics," signed on behalf of the US by President Nixon and on behalf of the USSR by General Secretary Brezhnev.

Both Sides are convinced that the provisions of that document open new possibilities for the development of peaceful relations and mutually beneficial cooperation between the USA and the USSR.

Having considered various areas of bilateral US-Soviet relations, the two Sides agreed that an improvement of relations is possible and desirable. They expressed their firm intention to act in accordance with the provisions set forth in the above-mentioned document.

As a result of progress made in negotiations which preceded the summit meeting, and in the course of the meeting itself, a number of significant agreements were reached. This will intensify bilateral cooperation in areas of common concern as well as in areas relevant to the cause of peace and international cooperation.

Limitation of Strategic Armaments

The two Sides gave primary attention to the problem of reducing the danger of nuclear war. They believe that curbing the competition in strategic arms will make a significant and tangible contribution to this cause.

The two Sides attach great importance to the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms concluded between them.

These agreements, which were concluded as a result of the negotiations in Moscow, constitute a major step towards curbing and ultimately ending the arms race.

They are a concrete expression of the intention of the two Sides to contribute to the relaxation of international tension and the strengthening of confidence between states, as well as to carry out the obligations assumed by them in the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (Article VI). Both Sides are convinced that the achievement of the above agreements is a practical step towards saving mankind from the threat of the outbreak of nuclear war. Accordingly, it corresponds to the vital interests of the American and Soviet peoples as well as to the vital interests of all other peoples.

The two Sides intend to continue active negotiations for the limitation of strategic offensive arms and to conduct them in a spirit of goodwill, respect for each other's legitimate interests and observance of the principle of equal security.

Both Sides are also convinced that the agreement on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War Between the USA and the USSR, signed in Washington on September 30, 1971, serves the interests not only of the Soviet and American peoples, but of all mankind.

Commercial and Economic Relations

Both Sides agreed on measures designed to establish more favorable conditions for developing commercial and other economic ties between the USA and the USSR. The two Sides agree that realistic conditions exist for increasing economic ties. These ties should develop on the basis of mutual benefit and in accordance with generally accepted international practice.

Believing that these aims would be served by conclusion of a trade agreement between the USA and the USSR, the two Sides decided to complete in the near future the work necessary to conclude such an agreement. They agreed on the desirability of credit arrangements to develop mutual trade and of early efforts to resolve other financial and economic issues. It was agreed that a lend-lease settlement will be negotiated concurrently with a trade agreement.

In the interests of broadening and facilitating commercial ties between the two countries, and to work out specific arrangements, the two Sides decided to create a US-Soviet Joint Commercial Commission. Its first meeting will be held in Moscow in the summer of 1972.

Each Side will help promote the establishment of effective

working arrangements between organizations and firms of both countries and encouraging the conclusion of long-term contracts.

Maritime Matters: Incidents at Sea

The two Sides agreed to continue the negotiations aimed at reaching an agreement on maritime and related matters. They believe that such an agreement would mark a positive step in facilitating the expansion of commerce between the United States and the Soviet Union.

An Agreement was concluded between the two Sides on measures to prevent incidents at sea and in air space over it between vessels and aircraft of the US and Soviet Navies. By providing agreed procedures for ships and aircraft of the two navies operating in close proximity, this agreement will diminish the chances of dangerous accidents.

Cooperation in Science and Technology

It was recognized that the cooperation now underway in areas such as atomic energy research, space research, health and other fields benefits both nations and has contributed positively to their over-all relations. It was agreed that increased scientific and technical cooperation on the basis of mutual benefit and shared effort for common goals is in the interest of both nations and would contribute to a further improvement in their bilateral relations. For these purposes the two Sides signed an agreement for cooperation in the fields of science and technology. A US-Soviet Joint Commission on Scientific and Technical Cooperation will be created for identifying and establishing cooperative programs.

Cooperation in Space

Having in mind the role played by the US and the USSR in the peaceful exploration of outer space, both Sides emphasized the importance of further bilateral cooperation in this sphere. In order to increase the safety of man's flights in outer space and the future prospects of joint scientific experiments, the two Sides agreed to make suitable arrangements to permit the docking of American and Soviet spacecraft and stations. The first joint docking experiment of the two countries' piloted spacecraft, with visits by astronauts and cosmonauts to each other's spacecraft, is contemplated for 1975. The planning and implementation of this flight will be carried out by the US National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the USSR Academy of Sciences, according to principles and procedures developed through mutual consultations.

Cooperation in the Field of Health

The two Sides concluded an agreement on health cooperation which marks a fruitful beginning of sharing knowledge about, and collaborative attacks on, the common enemies, disease and disability. The initial research efforts of the program will concentrate on health problems important to the whole world—cancer, heart diseases, and the environmental health sciences. This cooperation subsequently will be broadened to include other health problems of mutual interest. The two Sides pledged their full support for the health cooperation program and agreed to continue the active participation of the two governments in the work of international organizations in the health field.

AGREEMENT HANDSHAKE. President Richard M. Nixon (left) and the Soviet Union General Secretary of the Central Committee, Leonid Brezhnev, conclude an agreement-signing ceremony in Moscow with a handshake and smiles. (Official White House Photo)

Environmental Cooperation

The two Sides agreed to initiate a program of cooperation in the protection and enhancement of man's environment. Through joint research and joint measures, the United States and the USSR hope to contribute to the preservation of a healthful environment in their countries and throughout the world. Under the new agreement on environmental cooperation there will be consultations in the near future in Moscow on specific cooperative projects.

Exchanges in the Fields of Science, Technology, Education and Culture

Both Sides note the importance of the Agreement on Exchanges and Cooperation in Scientific, Technical, Education, Cultural, and Other Fields in 1972-1973, signed in Moscow on April 11, 1972. Continuation and expansion of bilateral exchanges in these fields will lead to better understanding and help improve the general state of relations between the two countries. Within the broad framework provided by this Agreement the two Sides have agreed to expand the areas of cooperation, as reflected in new agreements concerning space, health, the environment, and science and technology.

The US side, noting the existence of an extensive program of English language instruction in the Soviet Union, indicated its intention to encourage Russian language programs in the United States.

II. INTERNATIONAL ISSUES

Europe

In the course of the discussions on the international situation, both Sides took note of favorable developments in the relaxation of tensions in Europe.

Recognizing the importance to world peace of developments in Europe, where both World Wars originated, and mindful of the responsibilities and commitments which they share with other powers under appropriate agreements, the USA and the USSR intend to make further efforts to ensure a peaceful future for Europe, free of tensions, crises and conflicts.

They agreed that the territorial integrity of all states in Europe should be respected.

Both Sides view the September 3, 1971 Quadripartite Agreement relating to the Western Sectors of Berlin as a good example of fruitful cooperation between the states concerned, including the USA and the USSR. The two Sides believe that the implementation of that agreement in the near future, along with other steps, will further improve the European situation and contribute to the necessary trust among states.

Both Sides welcomed the treaty between the USSR and the Federal Republic of Germany signed on August 12, 1970. They noted the significance of the provisions of this treaty as well as of other recent agreements in contributing to confidence and cooperation among the European states.

The USA and the USSR are prepared to make appropriate contributions to the positive trends on the European continent toward a genuine detente and the development of relations of peaceful cooperation among states in Europe on the basis of the principles of territorial integrity and inviolability of frontiers, non-interference in internal affairs, sovereign equality, independence and renunciation of the use or threat of force.

The US and the USSR are in accord that multilateral consultations looking toward a Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe could begin after the signature of the Final Quadripartite Protocol of the Agreement of September 3, 1971. The two governments agree that the conference should be carefully prepared in order that it may concretely consider specific problems of security and cooperation and thus contribute to the progressive reduction of the underlying causes of tension in Europe. This conference should be convened at a time to be agreed by the countries concerned but without undue delay.

Both Sides believe that the goal of ensuring stability and security in Europe would be served by a reciprocal reduction of armed forces and armaments first of all in Central Europe. Any agreement on this question should not diminish the security of any of the Sides. Appropriate agreement should be reached as soon as practicable between the states concerned on the procedures for negotiations on this subject in a special forum.

The Middle East

The two Sides set out their positions on this question. They reaffirm their support for a peaceful settlement in the Middle East in accordance with Security Council Resolution 242.

Noting the significance of constructive cooperation of the parties concerned with the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General, Ambassador Jarring, the US and the USSR confirm their desire to contribute to his mission's success and also declare their readiness to play their part in bringing about a peaceful settlement in the Middle East. In the view of the US and the USSR, the achievement of such a settlement would open prospects for the normalization of the Middle East situation and would permit, in particular, consideration of further steps to bring about a military relaxation in that area.

Indochina

Each Side set forth its respective standpoint with regard to the continuing war in Vietnam and the situation in the area of Indochina as a whole.

The US side emphasized the need to bring an end to the military conflict as soon as possible and reaffirmed its commitment to the principle that the political future of South Vietnam should be left for the South Vietnamese people to decide for themselves, free from outside interference.

The US side explained its view that the quickest and most effective way to attain the above-mentioned objectives is through negotiations leading to the return of all Americans held captive in the region, the implementation of an internationally supervised Indochina-wide ceasefire and the subsequent withdrawal of all American forces stationed in South Vietnam within four months, leaving the political questions to be resolved by the Indochinese people themselves.

The United States reiterated its willingness to enter into serious negotiations with the North Vietnamese Side to settle the war in Indochina on a basis just to all.

The Soviet side stressed its solidarity with the just struggle of the peoples of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia for their freedom, independence and social progress. Firmly supporting the proposals of the DRV and the Republic of South Vietnam, which provide a realistic and constructive basis for settling the Vietnam problem, the Soviet Union stands for a cessation of bombings of the DRV, for a complete and unequivocal with-

drawal of the troops of the USA and its allies from South Vietnam, so that the peoples of Indochina would have the possibility to determine for themselves their fate without any outside interference.

Disarmament Issues

The two Sides expressed their positions on arms limitation and disarmament issues.

The two Sides note that in recent years their joint and parallel actions have facilitated the working out and conclusion of treaties which curb the arms race or ban some of the most dangerous types of weapons. They note further that these treaties were welcomed by a large majority of the states in the world, which became parties to them.

Both sides regard the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxic Weapons and on their Destruction, as an essential disarmament measure. Along with Great Britain, they are the depositories for the Convention which was recently opened for signature by all states. The USA and the USSR will continue their efforts to reach an international agreement regarding chemical weapons.

The USA and the USSR, proceeding from the need to take into account the security interests of both countries on the basis of the principle of equality, and without prejudice to the security interests of third countries, will actively participate in negotiations aimed at working out new measures designed to curb and end the arms race. The ultimate purpose is general and complete disarmament, including nuclear disarmament, under strict international control. A world disarmament conference could play a role in this process at an appropriate time.

Strengthening the United Nations

Both Sides will strive to strengthen the effectiveness of the United Nations on the basis of strict observance of the UN Charter. They regard the United Nations as an instrument for maintaining world peace and security, discouraging conflicts, and developing international cooperation. Accordingly, they will do their best to support United Nations efforts in the interests of international peace.

Both Sides emphasized that agreements and understandings reached in the negotiations in Moscow, as well as the contents and nature of these negotiations, are not in any way directed against any other country. Both Sides proceed from the recognition of the role, the responsibility and the prerogatives of other interested states, existing international obligations and agreements, and the principles and purposes of the UN Charter.

Both Sides believe that positive results were accomplished in the course of the talks at the highest level. These results indicate that despite the differences between the USA and the USSR in social systems, ideologies, and policy principles, it is possible to develop mutually advantageous cooperation between the peoples of both countries, in the interests of strengthening peace and international security.

Both Sides expressed the desire to continue close contact on a number of issues that were under discussion. They agreed that regular consultations on questions of mutual interest, including meetings at the highest level, would be useful.

In expressing his appreciation for the hospitality accorded him in the Soviet Union, President Nixon invited General Secretary L. I. Brezhnev, Chairman N. V. Podgorny, and Chairman A. N. Kosygin to visit the United States at a mutually convenient time. This invitation was accepted.

INTERNATIONAL POLICY FEATURE: SALT

Defense Secretary Discusses SALT Agreement With Solons

Statement of Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Strategic Armaments and National Security, Wednesday, June 21, 1972

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

I am pleased to be here today to discuss matters related to the ABM Treaty and the interim agreement on offensive weapons, and to pursue the consultative process with the Congress which the President emphasized in his meeting with you last week.

It is my view that what we are considering is a triple play for peace. We must take into account at the same time all three elements of this triple play:

1. The ABM Treaty.

2. The interim agreement on offensive weapons.

3. The President's National Security Budget.

The specifics of the agreements and other considerations related to them are, of course, being treated by other officials of the Administration such as the Secretary of State, the Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and the Director of Central Intelligence. The President has asked me to concentrate on the relationship of the agreements to the security of the United States, with appropriate emphasis on the critical importance of proposed U.S. strategic programs to the viability of the agreements already reached, and those we hope to reach in follow-on talks that could begin this October.

(Continued on next page)

Melvin R. Laird
(Official U.S. Navy Photo by PH2 Thomas M. Putnam)

I believe the ABM Treaty and the interim agreement on offensive weapons now before the Congress are in the interest of America and the world. They enhance our security. They permit us to maintain needed strength. They help us to maintain confidence in the effectiveness and realism of our strategic deterrent. I am confident they can be verified by national means.

But by themselves they do not automatically guarantee these national security gains.

In my view, the national security requirements of the United States make it equally urgent that: 1) the Senate ratify the ABM Treaty; 2) the Congress approve the Interim Agreement on offensive weapons; and 3) the House and Senate reinforce these initatives for arms limitation with strong support of the President's revised defense budget.

As the President has made clear, the merits of each case—the agreements and our pending strategic programs—require affirmative Congressional action in both cases.

Security, the basis of a peace, cannot be bought cheaply. The opportunities for enhanced security embodied in the SALT Agreements would be nullified and our national security jeopardized unless there is continued strong support for an adequate defense budget. The success of SALT and prospects for ultimate peace depend on sustained strength.

If we do not maintain this strength by going forward with the strategic programs we are recommending, we will face the problems similar to those we had to face in SALT-I:

—An onrushing and unchecked Soviet momentum in development and deployment, reflected by the addition of ballistic missiles at the rate of some 250 per year for the past five years.

—A reluctance on the part of the Soviet Union to accept limitations on certain ongoing programs and other development programs.

—With the exception of Safeguard, no major U.S. deployment programs, but rather qualitative improvements in existing systems.

Only by intense negotiations were we successful in achieving the limitations contained in the interim agreement. Wishful thinking about what we might want the other side to do has no place in successful negotiations, nor does it have a place in planning our national security. As you know from your briefings on the Agreements, limitations advocated by some were the subject of discussion and negotiation, but we could not reach agreement in all areas. I am, of course, referring to MIRV limitations among other things. In short, the agreements reached were dictated by the strategic balance and ongoing programs. They reflect what could be obtained through negotiations, not what some might have advocated as more desirable.

The programs that we are recommending are designed not to jockey for some unilateral advantage within the bounds of these agreements, but in full recognition of the fact that they are necessary for our national security. The President reported last week that Mr. Brezhnev and his colleagues in Moscow had made it absolutely clear that they intended to go forward with defense programs in the offensive area not limited by these agreements. It should be no surprise when I report to you that this is precisely what they are doing.

Both as a Member of Congress and when I became Secretary of Defense, I thought it was essential to apply the brakes to the onrushing Soviet strategic weapons momentum. With ratification of these agreements, we will have accomplished this objective.

As a legislator and as a member of the Executive Branch, I have always felt that it is essential for us to maintain technological superiority. With approval of the President's budget request, this objective also will be sustained.

The defense programs that are before the Congress are needed to preserve the effectiveness of our deterrent, both with and without SALT. Without the current agreements before you, we would be taking further measures to protect our deterrent capability. With the agreements, we can continue our programs in prudent fashion as we move into follow-on negotiations in October.

Let me briefly summarize the major programs we are proposing for you.

We need **Trident** at the earliest possible date. Last year we made the decision to accelerate Trident as the most appropriate new strategic initiative to preserve the sufficiency of our deterrent for the future. We should move forward to be in a position to deploy the first submarine on schedule.

It should be noted that our program will not get the first Trident submarine into operation until after the scheduled expiration date of the interim agreement. Even though an increase from the present 41 to 44 boats is permitted, the U.S. total number of operational SLBM submarines will not increase during the period of this agreement. As you know, Trident is also presently planned as a replacement system.

Similarly, the **B-1** bomber development program must be kept on schedule. It is designed to provide us an option to deploy the first aircraft in the late 1970s.

With regard to the **NCA Defense** contemplated in the ABM Treaty, we can fund the NCA Defense in FY 73 and still reduce the ABM budget request by $650 million. As I have reported to you, system components originally slated for defense of Minuteman sites will be continued with the objective of using these components at Washington. During FY 73, we propose to continue studies of NCA Defense, continue advanced site preparation, and keep open options for specific NCA Defense configuration.

The **Site Defense** prototype development program, as permitted in the Treaty, preserves the option to deploy a terminal defense of U.S. ICBMs, should that become necessary. The pending Site Defense program will provide for earlier availability of developmental hardware, earlier development of software, and earlier test and demonstration.

The revised **satellite basing program** will provide more rapid movement of our strategic bomber force to inland U.S. bases and, in addition, makes provision for reducing the time required to get them airborne.

The development of a **Submarine-Launched Cruise Missile** (SLCM) System is necessary to assure availability of future U.S. options for additional U.S. strength, if needed. The funding we are proposing will allow accelerated study of the SLCM System and initiate development of critical technology components such as propulsion and guidance. The Soviets, as you know, now have significant numbers of SCLMs deployed on nuclear boats and an active production program.

The SALT Agreements, in my view, underscore the importance of effective **Command, Control and Communications** (C^3). That is why we are recommending additional funding in FY 1973 to improve secure communications with the

airborne command post, advance our satellite technology, improve survivability of future computer data systems, and conduct system engineering studies of the World Wide Military Command and Control System.

We are also requesting moderate increases in funding to move forward with work on **improved re-entry vehicles** for our ballistic missiles.

Clearly, adequate and effective **verification** capabilities are necessary. We have such capabilities now and are proposing moderate increases in funding to assure that verification of these agreements by national means will remain adequate in the future.

We must continue to preserve our security and to negotiate from a position of strength.

I want to repeat what I told the Senate Armed Services Committee yesterday: we enter these agreements with the following interdependent strong convictions:

—Our security will be enhanced.

—We have applied brakes to the momentum of Soviet strategic missile deployments.

—We have adequate means of verification.

—Congress will support the strategic programs we have proposed and will propose.

—We have taken the initial steps and have laid a solid foundation for further arms limitation and potential arms reductions in the future.

In summary, Mr. Chairman:

—The agreements are good but we should not overlook the fact that the negotiations will continue, since we have only an interim agreement on offensive limitations.

—We will realize significant savings in strategic expenditures through these agreements that could be as much as $5 billion over the next five years even with approval of our ongoing and proposed programs.

—We can and must take further steps to insure continued security while at the same time enhancing prospects for successful follow-on negotiations. This is the way to move toward future benefits with respect both to our security and to our defense expenditures. But we are not in this position yet.

We can, and we will, move ahead with your support. I urge your support of these agreements and continued support of the programs necessary for the future sufficiency of our forces.

INTERNATIONAL POLICY FEATURE: SALT

DoD Summary Of Principal Impacts Of The Strategic Arms Limitation Agreements

Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty

1. Neither side is permitted to deploy a nationwide ABM defense or a base for such a defense.

2. Each side is permitted to deploy a limited defense of two areas—the national capital and one area containing ICBMs. In each defense area, out to a 150 km radius, each side is permitted up to 100 ABM launchers and interceptors and a limited radar base for these interceptors.

3. Neither side is permitted to give ABM capability to non-ABM systems, e.g., air defense systems.

4. Verification will be by national means. The parties have agreed not to interfere with these means.

5. The treaty will be of unlimited duration. Withdrawal is permitted for supreme interest.

Interim Offensive Agreement

1. Each side is permitted to keep any fixed land-based ICBM launchers currently operational or under construction. No new fixed land-based ICBM launchers may be built.

2. The Soviets may complete the 313 modern large ballistic missile launchers, e.g., for SS-9 class missiles, currently operational and under construction. No new ones may be built.

3. Neither side may convert to modern large ballistic missile launchers any other ICBM launchers.

4. Each side may keep any SLBM launchers operational or under construction. Also, newer SLBM launchers may be built as replacements for older SLBM launchers or for older heavy ICBM launchers.

5. Verification will be by national means. The parties have agreed not to interfere with these means.

6. The duration of the Agreement is five years. Withdrawal is permitted for supreme interest. The parties have agreed in the ABM Treaty to continue active negotiations for limitations on strategic offensive arms.

Offensive Forces Summary	USSR	US
Modern large ballistic missile launchers (e.g., for SS-9 class missiles)	313	0
Other ICBM launchers not replaceable with SLBM launchers (e.g., for Minuteman and SS-11 class missiles)	1096	1000
SLBM launchers and older ICBM launchers replaceable with SLBM launchers	950	710
Missile Totals	2359	1710
Heavy Bombers (1972) (not limited by the agreement)	140	457
Total Delivery Vehicles	2499	2167

REMARKS OF PRESIDENT RICHARD NIXON IN A RADIO AND TELEVISION ADDRESS TO THE PEOPLE OF THE SOVIET UNION GREEN ROOM GRAND KREMLIN PALACE AT 1:30 P.M. EDT, MAY 28, 1972

Dobry Vecher:

I deeply appreciate this opportunity your government has given me to speak directly with the people of the Soviet Union, to bring you a message of friendship from all the people of the United States and to share with you some of my thoughts about the relations between our two countries and about the way to peace and progress in the world.

This is my fourth visit to the Soviet Union. On these visits I have gained a great respect for the peoples of the Soviet Union, for your strength, your generosity, your determination, for the diversity and richness of your cultural heritage, for your many achievements.

In the three years I have been in office, one of my principal aims has been to establish a better relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. Our two countries have much in common. Most important of all, we have never fought one another in war. On the contrary, the memory of your soldiers and ours embracing at the Elbe, as allies, in 1945, remains strong in millions of hearts in both of our countries. It is my hope that that memory can serve as an inspiration for the renewal of Soviet-American cooperation in the 1970s.

As great powers, we shall sometimes be competitors, but we need never be enemies.

Peaceful Competition

Thirteen years ago, when I visited your country as Vice President, I addressed the people of the Soviet Union on radio and television, as I am addressing you tonight. I said then, "Let us have peaceful competition, not only in producing the best factories, but in producing better lives for our people. Let us cooperate in our exploration of outer space. Let our aim be not victory over other peoples, but the victory of all mankind over hunger, want, misery and disease, wherever it exists in the world."

In our meetings this week, we have begun to bring some of those hopes to fruition. Shortly after we arrived here on Monday afternoon, a brief rain fell on Moscow, of a kind that I am told is called a mushroom rain, a warm rain, with sunshine breaking through that makes the mushrooms grow and is therefore considered a good omen. The month of May is early for mushrooms, but as our talks progressed this week, what did grow was even better. A far-reaching set of agreements that can lead to a better life for both of our peoples, to a better chance for peace in the world.

We have agreed on joint ventures in space. We have agreed on ways of working together to protect the environment, to advance health, to cooperate in science and technology. We have agreed on means of preventing incidents at sea. We have established the commission to expand trade between our two nations.

An Historic First Step

Most important, we have taken an historic first step in the limitation of nuclear strategic arms. This arms control agreement is not for the purpose of giving either side an advantage over the other. Both of our nations are strong, each respects the strength of the other, each will maintain the strength necessary to defend its independence.

But in an unchecked arms race between two great nations, there would be no winners, only losers. By setting this limitation together, the people of both of our nations, and of all nations, can be winners. If we continue in the spirit of serious purpose that has marked our discussions this week, these agreements can start us on a new road of cooperation for the benefit of our people, for the benefit of all people.

There is an old proverb that says, "Make peace with man and quarrel with your sins." The hardships and evils that beset all men and all nations, these and these alone are what we should make war upon.

Significant Progress

As we look at the prospects for peace, we see that we have made significant progress at reducing the possible sources of direct conflict between us. But history tells us that great nations have often been dragged into war without intending it, but by conflicts between smaller nations. As great powers, we can and should use our influence to prevent this from happening. Our goal should be to discourage aggression in other parts of the world and particularly among those smaller nations that look to us for leadership and example.

With great power goes great responsibility. When a man walks with a great tread, he must be careful where he sets his feet. There can be true peace only when the weak are as safe as the strong. The wealthier and more powerful our own nations become, the more we have to lose from war and the threat of war,

(See ADDRESS, Page 28)

COMMANDERS DIGEST

A publication of the Department of Defense intended to provide official information to commanders and key personnel on matters related to Defense policies and interests, and to create better understanding and teamwork within the Department of Defense.

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U.S.-Soviet Agreements : Complete Texts

Strategic arms limitations will have an effect on every U.S. military commander and the forces under his jurisdiction. Following are verbatim texts of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, the Interim Agreement and the Protocol to the Interim Agreement on Strategic Arms Limitation, signed by President Richard Nixon and General Secretary Leonid I. Brezhnev on May 26.
On June 13, the documents were transmitted to Congress for ratification and approval. The text of the President's letter to the Senate is printed on Page Eight.

Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems. May 26, 1972

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Proceeding from the premise that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all mankind,

Considering that effective measures to limit anti-ballistic missile systems would be a substantial factor in curbing the race in strategic offensive arms and would lead to a decrease in the risk of outbreak of war involving nuclear weapons,

Proceeding from the premise that the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems, as well as certain agreed measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms, would contribute to the creation of more favorable conditions for further negotiations on limiting strategic arms,

Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Declaring their intention to achieve at the earliest possible date the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to take effective measures toward reductions in strategic arms, nuclear disarmament, and general and complete disarmament,

Desiring to contribute to the relaxation of international tension and the strengthening of trust between states,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

1. Each Party undertakes to limit anti-ballistic missile (ABM) systems and to adopt other measures in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty.

2. Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems for a defense of the territory of its country and not to provide a base for such a defense, and not to deploy ABM systems for defense of an individual region except as provided for in Article III of this Treaty.

Article II

1. For the purpose of this Treaty an ABM system is a system to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory, currently consisting of:

SIGNING CEREMONY. As President Richard Nixon blots his signature after signing one of several historic agreements reached during the recent Moscow Summit talks, Soviet General Secretary of the Central Committee Leonid Brezhnev, right, and Soviet Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR Alexei Kosygin, left, look on. Among the documents signed were three which relate to Strategic Arms Limitation: the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT), the Interim Agreement and the Protocol to the Interim Agreement. Verbatim texts of the documents are in the pages that follow, along with a Department of Defense Fact Sheet, summarizing the main points covered by the documents. (Wide World Photo)

(a) ABM interceptor missiles, which are interceptor missiles constructed and deployed for an ABM role, or of a type tested in an ABM mode;

(b) ABM launchers, which are launchers constructed and deployed for launching ABM interceptor missiles; and

(c) ABM radars, which are radars constructed and deployed for an ABM role, or of a type tested in an ABM mode.

2. The ABM system components listed in paragraph 1 of this Article include those which are:

(a) operational;
(b) under construction;
(c) undergoing testing;
(d) undergoing overhaul, repair or conversion; or
(e) mothballed.

Article III

Each Party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems or their components except that:

(a) within one ABM system deployment area having a radius of one hundred and fifty kilometers and centered on the Party's national capital, a Party may deploy: (1) no more than one hundred ABM launchers and no more than one hundred ABM interceptor missiles at launch sites, and (2) ABM radars within no more than six ABM radar complexes, the area of each complex being circular and having a diameter of no more than three kilometers; and

(b) within one ABM system deployment area having a radius of one hundred and fifty kilometers and containing ICBM silo launchers, a Party may deploy: (1) no more than one hundred ABM launchers and no more than one hundred ABM interceptor missiles at launch sites, (2) two large phased-array ABM radars comparable in potential to corresponding ABM radars operational or under construction on the date of signature of the Treaty in an ABM system deployment area containing ICBM silo launchers, and (3) no more than eighteen ABM radars each having a potential less than the potential of the smaller of the above-mentioned two large phase-array ABM radars.

Article IV

The limitations provided for in Article III shall not apply to ABM systems or their components used for development or testing, and located within current or additionally agreed test ranges. Each Party may have no more than a total of fifteen ABM launchers at test ranges.

Article V

1. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based.

2. Each Party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM launchers for launching more than one ABM interceptor missile at a time from each launcher, nor to modify deployed launchers to provide them with such a capability, nor to develop, test, or deploy automatic or semi-automatic or other similar systems for rapid reload of ABM launchers.

Article VI

To enhance assurance of the effectiveness of the limitations on ABM systems and their components provided by this Treaty, each Party undertakes:

(a) not to give missiles, launchers, or radars, other than ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars, capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory and not to test them in an ABM mode; and

(b) not to deploy in the future radars for early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack except at locations along the periphery of its national territory and oriented outward.

Spartan Missile Test (1970)

Article VII

Subject to the provisions of this Treaty, modernization and replacement of ABM systems or their components may be carried out.

Article VIII

ABM systems or their components in excess of the numbers or outside the areas specified in this Treaty, as well as ABM systems or their components prohibited by this Treaty, shall be destroyed or dismantled under agreed procedures within the shortest possible agreed period of time.

Article IX

To assure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty, each Party undertakes not to transfer to other States, and not to deploy outside its national territory, ABM systems or their components limited by this Treaty.

Article X

Each Party undertakes not to assume any international obligations which would conflict with this Treaty.

Article XI

The Parties undertake to continue active negotiations for limitations on strategic offensive arms.

Article XII

1. For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall use na-

tional technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.

3. Each Party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty. This obligation shall not require changes in current construction, assembly, conversion, or overhaul practices.

Article XIII

1. To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties shall establish promptly a Standing Consultative Commission, within the framework of which they will:

(a) consider questions concerning compliance with the obligations assumed and related situations which may be considered ambiguous;

(b) provide on a voluntary basis such information as either Party considers necessary to assure confidence in compliance with the obligations assumed;

(c) consider questions involving unintended interference with national technical means of verification;

(d) consider possible changes in the strategic situation which have a bearing on the provisions of this Treaty;

(e) agree upon procedures and dates for destruction or dismantling of ABM systems or their components in cases provided for by the provisions of this Treaty;

(f) consider, as appropriate, possible proposals for further increasing the viability of this Treaty, including proposals for amendments in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty;

(g) consider, as appropriate, proposals for further measures aimed at limiting strategic arms.

2. The Parties through consultation shall establish, and may amend as appropriate, Regulations for the Standing Consultative Commission governing procedures, composition and other relevant matters.

Article XIV

1. Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed amendments shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures governing the entry into force of this Treaty.

2. Five years after entry into force of this Treaty, and at five-year intervals thereafter, the Parties shall together conduct a review of this Treaty.

Article XV

1. This Treaty shall be of unlimited duration.

2. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from the Treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.



Soviet "Yankee"-Class Submarine

Article XVI

1. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party. The Treaty shall enter into force on the day of the exchange of instruments of ratification.

2. This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Done at Moscow on May 26, 1972, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
RICHARD NIXON
President of the United States of America

FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
LEONID I. BREZHNEV
General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU

Interim Agreement Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on Certain Measures With Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. May 26, 1972

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Convinced that the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and this Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms will contribute to the creation of more favorable conditions for active negotiations on limiting strategic arms as well as to the relaxation of internatinal tension and the strengthening of trust between States,



Poseidon

Minuteman

The U.S. Missiles: Deterrence

Taking into account the relationship between strategic offensive and defensive arms,

Mindful of their obligations under Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons,

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

The Parties undertake not to start construction of additional fixed land-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers after July 1, 1972.

Article II

The Parties undertake not to convert land-based launchers for light ICBMs, or for ICBMs of older types deployed prior to 1964, into land-based launchers for heavy ICBMs of types deployed after that time.

Article III

The Parties undertake to limit submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers and modern ballistic missile submarines to the numbers operational and under construction on the date of signature of this Interim Agreement, and in addition launchers and submarines constructed under procedures established by the Parties as replacements for an equal number of ICBM launchers of older types deployed prior to 1964 or for launchers on older submarines.

Article IV

Subject to the provisions of this Interim Agreement, modernization and replacement of strategic offensive ballistic missiles and launchers covered by this Interim Agreement may be undertaken.

Article V

1. For the purpose of providing assurance of compliance with the provisions of this Interim Agreement, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.

3. Each Party undertakes not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means of compliance with the provisions of this Interim Agreement. This obligation shall not require changes in current construction, assembly, conversion, or overhaul practices.

Article VI

To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Interim Agreement, the Parties shall use the Standing Consultative Commission established under Article XIII of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems in accordance with the provisions of that Article.

Article VII

The Parties undertake to continue active negotiations for limitations on strategic offensive arms. The obligations provided for in this Interim Agreement shall not prejudice the

scope or terms of the limitations on strategic offensive arms which may be worked out in the course of further negotiations.

Article VIII

1. This Interim Agreement shall enter into force upon exchange of written notices of acceptance by each Party, which exchange shall take place simultaneously with the exchange of instruments of ratification of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems.

2. This Interim Agreement shall remain in force for a period of five years unless replaced earlier by an agreement on more complete measures limiting strategic offensive arms. It is the objective of the Parties to conduct active follow-on negotiations with the aim of concluding such an agreement as soon as possible.

3. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Interim Agreement if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Interim Agreement have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from this Interim Agreement. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

Done at Moscow on May 26, 1972, in two copies each in the Russian and English languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
LEONID I. BREZHNEV
General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
RICHARD NIXON
President of the United States of America

May 26, 1972

PROTOCOL

TO THE INTERIM AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS OF CERTAIN MEASURES WITH RESPECT TO THE LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Having agreed on certain limitations relating to submarine-launched ballistic missile launchers and modern ballistic missile submarines, and to replacement procedures, in the Interim Agreement,

Have agreed as follows:

The Parties understand that, under Article III of the Interim Agreement, for the period during which that Agreement remains in force:

The U.S. may have no more than 710 ballistic missile launchers on submarines (SLBMs) and no more than 44 modern ballistic missile submarines. The Soviet Union may have no more than 950 ballistic missile launchers on submarines and no more than 62 modern ballistic missile submarines.

Additional ballistic missile launchers on submarines up to the above-mentioned levels, in the U.S.—over 656 ballistic missile launchers on nuclear-powered submarines, and in the U.S.S.R.—over 740 ballistic missile launchers on nuclear-powered submarines, operational and under construction, may become operational as replacements for equal numbers of ballistic missile launchers of older types deployed prior to 1964 or of ballistic missile launchers on older submarines.

The deployment of modern SLBMs on any submarine, regardless of type, will be counted against the total level of SLBMs permitted for the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.

This Protocol shall be considered an integral part of the Interim Agreement.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
RICHARD NIXON
President of the United States of America

FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS
LEONID I. BREZHNEV
General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU



North American Defense Command (NORAD) Command Post: Remaining on Alert

On June 13, 1972

President's Letter of Transmittal Sent to Congress

President Richard Nixon sent copies of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty, the Interim Agreement and the Protocol to the Interim Agreement to the Congress on June 13, urging the legislators to take prompt action toward ratification. Following is Mr. Nixon's letter to the Senate; a similar letter was sent with the documents to the House of Representatives.

THE WHITE HOUSE

TO THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES:

I transmit herewith certified copies of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems and the Interim Agreement on Certain Measures with respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms signed in Moscow on May 26, 1972. Copies of these agreements are also being forwarded to the Speaker of the House of Representatives. I ask the Senate's advice and consent to ratification of the Treaty, and an expression of support from both Houses of the Congress for the Interim Agreement on Strategic Offensive Arms.

These agreements, the product of a major effort of this administration, are a significant step into a new era of mutually agreed restraint and arms limitation between the two principal nuclear powers.

The provisions of the agreements are explained in detail in the Report of the Secretary of State, which I attach. Their main effect is this: The ABM Treaty limits the deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems to two designated areas, and at a low level. The Interim Agreement limits the overall level of strategic offensive missile forces. Together the two agreements provide for a more stable strategic balance in the next several years than would be possible if strategic arms competition continued unchecked. This benefits not only the United States and the Soviet Union, but all the nations of the world.

The agreements are an important first step in checking the arms race, but only a first step; they do not close off all avenues of strategic competition. Just as the maintenance of a strong strategic posture was an essential element in the success of these negotiations, it is now equally essential that we carry forward a sound strategic modernization program to maintain our security and to ensure that more permanent and comprehensive arms limitation agreements can be reached.

The defense capabilities of the United States are second to none in the world today. I am determined that they shall remain so. The terms of the ABM Treaty and Interim Agreement will permit the United States to take the steps we deem necessary to maintain a strategic posture which protects our vital interests and guarantees our continued security.

Besides enhancing our national security, these agreements open the opportunity for a new and more constructive U.S.-Soviet relationship, characterized by negotiated settlement of differences, rather than by the hostility and confrontation of decades past.

These accords offer tangible evidence that mankind need not live forever in the dark shadow of nuclear war. They provide renewed hope that men and nations working together can succeed in building a lasting peace.

Because these agreements effectively serve one of this Nation's most cherished purposes—a more secure and peaceful world in which America's security is fully protected—I strongly recommend that the Senate support them, and that its deliberations be conducted without delay.

RICHARD NIXON

THE WHITE HOUSE,
June 13, 1972

Agreed Interpretations and Unilateral Statements

1. AGREED INTERPRETATIONS.

(a) Initialed Statements.

The texts of the statements set out below were agreed upon and initialed by the Heads of the Delegations on May 26, 1972.

ABM Treaty

[A]

The Parties understand that, in addition to the ABM radars which may be deployed in accordance with subparagraph (a) of Article III of the Treaty, those non-phased-array ABM radars operational on the date of signature of the Treaty within the ABM system deployment area for defense of the national capital may be retained.

[B]

The Parties understand that the potential (the product of mean emitted power in watts and antenna area in square meters) of the smaller of the two large phased-array ABM radars referred to in subparagraph (b) of Article III of the Treaty is considered for purposes of the Treaty to be three million.

[C]

The Parties understand that the center of the ABM system deployment area centered on the national capital and the center of the ABM system deployment area containing ICBM silo launchers for each Party shall be separated by no less than thirteen hundred kilometers.

[D]

The Parties agree not to deploy phased-array radars having a potential (the product of mean emitted power in watts and antenna area in square meters) exceeding three million, except as provided for in Articles III, IV, and VI of the Treaty, or except for the purposes of tracking objects in outer space or for use as national technical means of verification.

[E]

In order to insure fulfillment of the obligation not to deploy ABM systems and their components except as provided in Article III of the Treaty, the Parties agree that in the event ABM systems based on other physical principles and including components capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars are created in the future, specific limitations on such systems and their components would be subject to discussion in accordance with Article XIII and agreement in accordance with Article XIV of the Treaty.

[F]

The Parties understand that Article V of the Treaty includes obligations not to develop, test or deploy ABM interceptor missiles for the delivery by each ABM interceptor missile of more than one independently guided warhead.

[G]

The Parties understand that Article IX of the Treaty includes the obligation of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. not to provide to other States technical descriptions or blueprints specially worked out for the construction of ABM systems and their components limited by the Treaty.

Interim Agreement

[H]

The Parties understand that land-based ICBM launchers referred to in the Interim Agreement are understood to be launchers for strategic ballistic missiles capable of ranges in excess of the shortest distance between the northeastern border of the continental U.S. and the northwestern border of the continental U.S.S.R

[I]

The Parties understand that fixed land-based ICBM launchers under active construction as of the date of signature of the Interim Agreement may be completed.

[J]

The Parties understand that in the process of modernization and replacement the dimensions of land-based ICBM silo launchers will not be significantly increased.

[K]

The Parties understand that dismantling or destruction of ICBM launchers of older types deployed prior to 1964 and ballistic missile launchers on older submarines being replaced by new SLBM launchers on modern submarines will be initiated at the time of the beginning of sea trials of a replacement submarine, and will be completed in the shortest possible agreed period of time. Such dismantling or destruction, and timely notification thereof, will be accomplished under procedures to be agreed in the Standing Consultative Commission.

[L]

The Parties understand that during the period of the Interim Agreement there shall be no significant increase in the number of ICBM or SLBM test and training launchers, or in the number of such launchers for modern land-based heavy ICBMs. The Parties further understand that construction or conversion of ICBM launchers at test ranges shall be undertaken only for purposes of testing and training.

(b) Common Understandings.

Common understanding of the Parties on the following matters was reached during the negotiations:

A. Increase in ICBM Silo Dimensions

Ambassador Smith made the following statement on May 26, 1972: "The Parties agree that the term 'significantly increased' means that an increase will not be greater than 10-15 percent of the present dimensions of land-based ICBM silo launchers."

Minister Semenov replied that this statement corresponded to the Soviet understanding.

B. Location of ICBM Defenses

The U.S. Delegation made the following statement on May 26, 1972: "Article III of the ABM Treaty provides for each side one ABM system deployment area centered on its national capital and one ABM system deployment area containing ICBM silo launchers. The two sides have registered agreement on the following statement: 'The Parties understand that the center of the ABM system deployment area centered on the national capital and the center of the ABM system deployment area containing ICBM silo launchers for each Party shall be separated by no less than thirteen hundred kilometers.' In this connection, the U.S. side notes that its ABM system deployment area for defense of ICBM silo launchers, located west of the Mississippi River, will be centered in the Grand Forks [North Dakota] ICBM silo launcher deployment area" (See Initialed Statement [C].)

C. ABM Test Ranges

The U.S. Delegation made the following statement on April 26, 1972: "Article IV of the ABM Treaty provides that 'the limitations provided for in Article III shall not apply to ABM systems or their components used for development or testing, and located within current or additionally agreed test ranges.' We believe it would be useful to assure that there is no misunderstanding as to current ABM test ranges. It is our understanding that ABM test ranges encompass the area within which ABM components are located for test purposes. The current U.S. ABM test ranges are at White Sands, New Mexico, and at Kwajalein Atoll, and the current Soviet ABM test range is near Sary Shagan in Kazakhstan. We consider that non-phased array radars of types used for range safety or instrumentation purposes may be located outside of ABM test ranges. We interpret the reference in Article IV to 'additionally agreed test ranges' to mean that ABM components will not be located at any other test ranges without prior agreement between our Governments that there will be such additional ABM test ranges."

On May 5, 1972, the Soviet Delegation stated that there was a common understanding on what ABM test ranges were, that the use of the types of non-ABM radars for range safety or instrumentation was not limited under the Treaty, that the reference in Article IV to "additionally agreed" test ranges was sufficiently clear, and that national means permitted identifying current test ranges.

D. Mobile ABM Systems

On January 28, 1972, the U.S. Delegation made the following statement: "Article V(1) of the Joint Draft Text of the ABM Treaty includes an undertaking not to develop, test, or deploy mobile land-based ABM systems and their components. On May 5, 1971, the U.S. side indicated that, in its view, a prohibition on deployment of mobile ABM systems and components would rule out the deployment of ABM launchers and radars which were not permanent fixed types. At that time, we asked for the Soviet view of this interpretation. Does the Soviet side agree with the U.S. side's interpretation put forward on May 5, 1971?"

On April 13, 1972, the Soviet Delegation said there is a general common understanding on this matter.

E. Standing Consultative Commission

Ambassador Smith made the following statement on May 23, 1972: "The United States proposes that the sides agree that, with regard to initial implementation of the ABM Treaty's Article XIII on the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC) and of the consultation Articles to the Interim Agreement on offensive arms and the Accidents Agreement*, agreement establishing the SCC will be worked out early in the follow-on SALT negotiations; until that is completed, the following arrangements will prevail: when SALT is in session, any consultation desired by either side under these Articles can be carried out by the two SALT Delegations; when SALT is not in session, *ad hoc* arrangements for any desired consultations under these Articles may be made through diplomatic channels."

Minister Semenov replied that, on an *ad referendum* basis, he could agree that the U.S. statement corresponded to the Soviet understanding.

F. Standstill

On May 6, 1972, Minister Semenov made the following statement: "In an effort to accommodate the wishes of the U.S. side, the Soviet Delegation is prepared to proceed on the basis that the two sides will in fact observe the obligations of both the Interim Agreement and the ABM Treaty beginning from the date of signature of these two documents."

In reply, the U.S. Delegation made the following statement on May 20, 1972: "The U.S. agrees in principle with the Soviet statement made on May 6 concerning observance of obligations beginning from date of signature but we would like to make clear our understanding that this means that, pending ratification and acceptance, neither side would take any action prohibited by the agreements after they had entered into force. This understanding would continue to apply in the absence of notification by either signatory of its intention not to proceed with ratification or approval."

The Soviet Delegation indicated agreement with the U.S. statement.

2. UNILATERAL STATEMENTS.

(a) The following noteworthy unilateral statements were made during the negotiations by the United States Delegation:—

A. Withdrawal from the ABM Treaty

On May 9, 1972, Ambassador Smith made the following statement: "The U.S. Delegation has stressed the importance the U.S. Government attaches to achieving agreement on more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms, following agreement on an ABM Treaty and on an Interim Agreement on certain measures with respect to the limitation

* See Article 7 of Agreement to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, signed September 30, 1971.

Artist's concept of the Trident, formerly ULMS (Undersea Long-Range Missile System)

of strategic offensive arms. The U.S. Delegation believes that an objective of the follow-on negotiations should be to constrain and reduce on a long-term basis threats to the survivability of our respective strategic retaliatory forces. The U.S.S.R. Delegation has also indicated that the objectives of SALT would remain unfulfilled without the achievement of an agreement providing for more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms. Both sides recognize that the initial agreements would be steps toward the achievement of more complete limitations on strategic arms. If an agreement providing for more complete strategic offensive arms limitations were not achieved within five years, U.S. supreme interests could be jeopardized. Should that occur, it would constitute a basis for withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. The U.S. does not wish to see such a situation occur, nor do we believe that the U.S.S.R. does. It is because we wish to prevent such a situation that we emphasize the importance the U.S. Government attaches to achievement of more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms. The U.S. Executive will inform the Congress, in connection with Congressional consideration of the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement of this statement of the U.S. position."

B. Land-Mobile ICBM Launchers

The U.S. Delegation made the following statement on May 20, 1972: "In connection with the important subject of land-mobile ICBM launchers, in the interest of concluding the Interim Agreement the U.S. Delegation now withdraws its proposal that Article I or an agreed statement explicitly prohibit the deployment of mobile land-based ICBM launchers. I have been instructed to inform you that, while agreeing to defer the question of limitation of operational land-mobile ICBM lanuchers to the subsequent negotiations on more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms, the U.S. would consider the deployment of operational land-mobile ICBM launchers during the period of the Interim Agreement as inconsistent with the objectives of that Agreement."

C. Covered Facilities

The U.S. Delegation made the following statement on May 20, 1972: "I wish to emphasize the importance that the United States attaches to the provisions of Article V, including in particular their application to fitting out or berthing submarines."

D. "Heavy" ICBMs

The U.S. Delegation made the following statement on May 26, 1972: "The U.S. Delegation regrets that the Soviet Delegation has not been willing to agree on a common definition of a heavy missile. Under these circumstances, the U.S. Delegation believes it necessary to state the following: The United States would consider any ICBM having a volume significantly greater than that of the largest light ICBM now operational on either side to be a heavy ICBM. The U.S. proceeds on the premise that the Soviet side will give due account to this consideration."

E. Tested in ABM Mode

On April 7, 1972, the U.S. Delegation made the following statement: "Article II of the Joint Draft Text uses the term 'tested in an ABM mode,' in defining ABM components, and Article VI includes certain obligations concerning such testing. We believe that the sides should have a common understanding of this phrase. First, we would note that the testing provisions of the ABM Treaty are intended to apply to testing which occurs after the date of signature of the Treaty, and not to any testing which may have occurred in the past. Next, we would amplify the remarks we have made on this subject during the previous Helsinki phase by setting forth the objectives which govern the U.S. view on the subject, namely, while prohibiting testing of non-ABM components for ABM purposes: not to prevent testing of ABM components, and not to prevent testing of non-ABM components for non-ABM purposes. To clarify our intepretation of 'tested in an ABM mode,' we note that we would consider a launcher, misile or radar to be 'tested in an ABM mode' if, for example, any of the following events occur: (1) a launcher is used to launch an ABM interceptor missile, (2) an interceptor missile is flight tested against a target vehicle which has a flight trajectory with characteristics of a strategic ballistic missile flight trajectory, or is flight tested in conjunction with the test of an ABM interceptor missile or an ABM radar at the same test range, or is flight tested to an altitude inconsistent with interception of targets against which air defenses are deployed, (3) a radar makes measurements on a cooperative target vehicle of the kind referred to in item (2) above during the reentry portion of its trajectory or makes measurements in conjunction with the test of an ABM interceptor missile or an ABM radar at the same test range. Radars used for purposes such as range safety or instrumentation would be exempted from application of these criteria."

F. No-Transfer Article of ABM Treaty

On April 18, 1972, the U.S. Delegation made the following statement: "In regard to this Article [IX], I have a brief and I believe self-explanatory statement to make. The U.S. side wishes to make clear that the provisions of this Article do not set a precedent for whatever provision may be considered for a Treaty on Limiting Strategic Offensive Arms. The question of transfer of strategic offensive arms is a far more complex issue, which may require a different solution."

U.S. Polaris Submarine

G. No Increase in Defense of Early Warning Radars

On July 28, 1970, the U.S. Delegation made the following statement: "Since Hen House radars [Soviet ballistic missile early warning radars] can detect and track ballistic missile warheads at great distances, they have a significant ABM potential. Accordingly, the U.S. would regard any increase in the defenses of such radars by surface-to-air missiles as inconsistent with an agreement."

(b) The following noteworthy unilateral statement was made by the Delegation of the U.S.S.R. and is shown here with the U.S. reply:—

On May 17, 1972, Minister Semenov made the following unilateral "Statement of the Soviet Side:" "Taking into account that modern ballistic missile submarines are presently in the possession of not only the U.S., but also of its NATO allies, the Soviet Union agrees that for the period of effectiveness of the Interim 'Freeze' Agreement the U.S. and its NATO allies have up to 50 such submarines with a total of up to 800 ballistic missile launchers thereon (including 41 U.S. submarines with 656 ballistic missile launchers). However, if during the period of effectiveness of the Agreement U.S. allies in NATO should increase the number of their modern submarines to exceed the numbers of submarines they would have operational or under construction on the date of signature of the Agreement, the Soviet Union will have the right to a corresponding increase in the number of its submarines. In the opinion of the Soviet side, the solution of the question of modern ballistic missile submarines provided for in the Interim Agreement only partially compensates for the strategic imbalance in the deployment of the nuclear-powered missile submarines of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. Therefore, the Soviet side believes that this whole question, and above all the question of liquidating the American missile submarine bases outside the U.S., will be appropriately resolved in the course of follow-on negotiations."

On May 24, Ambassador Smith made the following reply to Minister Semenov: "The United States side has studied the 'statement made by the Soviet side' of May 17 concerning compensation for submarine basing and SLBM submarines belonging to third countries. The United States does not accept the validity of the considerations in that statement."

On May 26 Minister Semenov repeated the unilateral statement made on May 24. Ambassador Smith also repeated the U.S. rejection on May 26.

From the Secretary of State

Letter to President Explains SALT Agreements

On June 10, Secretary of State William P. Rogers, in a letter to President Richard Nixon, explained the ABM Treaty and related documents. His letter:

DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
June 10, 1972

The President:

I have the honor to submit to you the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty) and the Interim Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures with respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (Interim Agreement), including an associated Protocol. It is my recommendation that the ABM Treaty be transmitted to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification.

The Interim Agreement, as its title indicates, is an agreement limited in scope and time. It is designed to limit the aggregate number of intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launchers and submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) launchers, and the number of modern ballistic missile submarines, pending the negotiation of a treaty covering more complete limitations of strategic offensive arms. In these circumstances, I am submitting to you the Interim Agreement and its Protocol (which is an integral part of the Agreement), with the recommendation that they be transmitted to both Houses of Congress for approval by a Joint Resolution.

The Interim Agreement can by its terms enter into force only upon exchange of written notices of acceptance by both countries and only when and if the ABM Treaty is brought into force. Both signatories understand that, pending ratification and acceptance, neither will take any action that would be prohibited by the ABM Treaty or the Interim Agreement and Protocol, in the absence of notification by either signatory of its intention not to proceed with ratification or acceptance.

WILLIAM P. ROGERS
Secretary of State

ABM TREATY

In broad outline, the ABM Treaty, signed on May 26, 1972, provides that:

—A nationwide ABM deployment, and a base for such deployment, are prohibited;

—An ABM deployment for defense of an individual region is prohibited, except as specifically permitted;

—Permitted ABM deployments will be limited to two widely separated deployment areas in each country—one for the national capital, and the other for defense of ICBMs;

—For these purposes no more than 100 ABM launchers and no more than 100 ABM interceptor missiles at launch sites may be deployed within each 150-kilometer radius ABM deployment area, for a total of 200 deployed ABM interceptors and 200 deployed ABM launchers for each Party;

—ABM radars will be strictly controlled; radars to support the ABM defense of the national capital may be deployed only in a specified number of small radar complexes within the ABM deployment area; radars to support the ICBM defense will be limited to a specified number within the ABM deployment area and will also be subject to qualitative constraint.

In order to assure the effectiveness of these basic provisions of the Treaty, a number of detailed corollary provisions were also agreed:

—Development, testing and deployment of ABM systems or ABM components that are sea-based, air-based, space-based or mobile land-based are prohibited;

—Deployment of ABM systems involving new types of basic components to perform the current functions of ABM launchers, interceptors or radars is prohibited;

—The conversion or testing of other systems, such as air defense systems, or components thereof to perform an ABM role is prohibited.

The Treaty also contains certain general provisions relating to the verification and implementation of the Treaty and to further negotiations:

—Each side will use national technical means for verification and the Parties agree not to interfere with such means and not to take deliberate concealment measures;

—A Standing Consultative Commission will be established to facilitate implementation of the Treaty and consider questions arising thereunder;

—The Parties will continue active negotiations for limitations on strategic offensive arms.

The ABM Treaty consists of a preamble and sixteen Articles. As indicated in Article I(1), it provides for limitations

on antiballistic missile (ABM) systems as well as certain related measures. In the course of the negotiations, agreement was reached on a number of interpretive matters related to the Treaty. Enclosure 3 contains agreed interpretations and certain noteworthy unilateral statements.

PREAMBLE

The preamble contains six paragraphs that set forth common premises and objectives of the United States and the Soviet Union which are the basis for entering into this Treaty.

The first preambular paragraph states the basic premise that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all mankind.

The second and third preambular paragraphs indicate the rationale for the ABM Treaty and the accompanying Interim Agreement. Effective limits on antiballistic missile systems will be an important factor in curbing competition in the strategic offensive arms race, will decrease the risk of the outbreak of nuclear war, and will, together with certain agreed measures on the limitation of strategic offensive arms, create a favorable climate for future negotiations on limiting strategic arms.

The fourth and fifth preambular paragraphs indicate the relationship of this Treaty to the undertaking of the Parties in Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty to "pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament," and express the intention of the Parties to achieve further progress in disarmament at the earliest possible date.

The sixth paragraph reflects the broad international consensus that effective measures to limit strategic arms will assist in relaxing international tensions and strengthening trust between nations. As the first bilateral agreements between nuclear powers limiting strategic nuclear arms, this Treaty and the Interim Agreement should serve as historic steps toward broader political goals.

A. LIMITATIONS ON ABM SYSTEMS

(1) Deployment

Article I(2) prohibits the deployment of ABM systems which would provide defense covering substantially the whole of the territory of a Party. ABM defenses of individual regions are also prohibited except as specifically set forth in Article III. As more fully explained below, that Article limits not only the number, size and locations of the permitted ABM deployment areas of each Party, but also limits to low levels the numbers of ABM launchers and ABM interceptors at launch sites, and places restrictions on ABM radars, and thus has the effect of precluding thick regional ABM defenses.

Article I(2) also includes an undertaking not to provide a "base" for a nationwide ABM defense. This would, for example, prohibit the construction and deployment of ABM radars, or even ABM-capable radars deployed for other purposes, that could provide a base for a nationwide ABM system. (Articles III, IV, V and VI contain specific constraints that reinforce this prohibition.) The Treaty does not restrict air defense, space tracking, intelligence or other non-ABM systems *per se*. However, it does prohibit the testing or conversion of such systems or their components to perform an ABM role; moreover, the Parties have agreed not to deploy any phased-array radars over a certain size except as otherwise provided in the Treaty and except for the purpose of tracking objects in outer space or for use as national technical means of verification. This would prevent the possible use of such radars as a base for nationwide ABM defense.

Article II defines an ABM system as "a system to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory." It indicates that such systems currently consist of ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers and ABM radars. ABM interceptor missiles are interceptor missiles constructed and deployed for an ABM role, or of a type hereafter tested in an ABM mode. ABM launchers are launchers constructed and deployed for launching ABM interceptor missiles. (A launcher associated with an interceptor missile that is hereafter tested in an ABM mode falls within the definition of an ABM launcher.) ABM radars are radars constructed and deployed for an ABM role (including target tracking or missile control, but not early warning), or of a type hereafter tested in an ABM mode.

The second paragraph of Article II makes it clear that the ABM system components listed in the first paragraph of the Article include not only those which are operational, but also those under construction, undergoing testing, undergoing overhaul, repair or conversion, or mothballed.

Article III prohibits the deployment of any ABM systems or their components except as provided therein. Under Article III, the Parties may deploy only systems consisting of ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers and ABM radars. The limited deployment of such systems described in the next two paragraphs below is permitted only (a) within one deployment area centered on the nation's capital and having a radius of 150 kilometers, and (b) within one other deployment area having the same radius and containing ICBM silo launchers. The centers of the two deployment areas will be separated by no less than 1,300 kilometers.

In each of these deployment areas a Party may deploy no more than 100 ABM launchers and no more than 100 ABM interceptor missiles at launch sites. These totals would include any deployments within such areas for training purposes and, as indicated in Article II(2), would not be confined to those in operational status. In view of Article V(1), discussed below, only fixed, land-based ABM components may be deployed.

The restrictions on ABM radars cover radars of both existing types: phased-array radars (a modern type which scans by electronic means, a capability especially useful for ABM purposes) and mechanical-scan radars (an older type). These restrictions are as follows:

(i) Within the 150-kilometer radius deployment area centered on the nation's capital, no qualitative or quantitative constraints on radars are imposed, but location is circumscribed as follows: a Party may have ABM radars within no more than 6 ABM radar complexes, the permitted area of each complex being circular and having a diameter of no more than 3 kilometers. Phased-array ABM radars may not be located outside such complexes, regardless of when they become operational. Mechanical-scan ABM radars that become operational after May 26, 1972 are similarly constrained. The Parties understand that in addition to the ABM radars which may be deployed in accordance with this provision, the Soviet mechanical-scan ABM radars operational on May 26, 1972 within the deployment area for defense of its national capital may be retained.

(ii) Within the 150-kilometer radius deployment area for defense of ICBM silo launchers, the location of radars is

not circumscribed, but qualitative and quantitative constraints are imposed. A Party may have:

—2 large phased-array ABM radars comparable in potential to corresponding ABM radars operational or under construction on the date of signature of the Treaty in such a deployment area; and

—no more than 18 ABM radars each having a potential less than that of the smaller of the 2 large phased-array ABM radars referred to above.

The only two large phased-array ABM radars operational or under construction in such a deployment area on the date of signature were the Perimeter Acquisition Radar (PAR) and Missile Site Radar (MSR) under construction near Grand Forks Air Force Base, North Dakota. The Parties understand that the potential —the product of mean emitted power in watts and antenna area in square meters —of the smaller of these two radars (the MSR) is considered for purposes of the Treaty to be three million.

The impact of Article III on ABM systems currently deployed or under construction would be as follows: it would not prohibit the ABM system deployed around Moscow or the ABM system being deployed by the United States in the vicinity of Grand Forks Air Force Base in North Dakota, but it would preclude the completion or retention of the ABM complex on which construction had been started in the vicinity of Malmstrom Air Force Base in Montana. (The signatories understand that, pending ratification and acceptance of the agreements, neither will take any action that would be prohibited thereby in the absence of notification by either signatory of its intention not to proceed with ratification or approval.)

The United States has not started construction at a deployment area centered on its national capital, and the Soviet Union has not started construction at a deployment area for defense of ICBM silo launchers.

(2) Development, Testing and Other Limitations

Article IV provides that the limitations in Article III shall not apply to ABM systems or ABM components used for development or testing, and located within current or additionally agreed test ranges. It is understood that ABM test ranges encompass the area within which ABM components are located for test purposes, and that non-phased-array radars of types used for range safety or instrumentation purposes may be located outside of ABM test ranges. Article IV further provides that each Party may have no more than a total of 15 ABM launchers at test ranges. The current United States test ranges for ABM systems are located at White Sands, New Mexico and Kwajalein Atoll in the Pacific. The current Soviet test range for ABM systems is located near Sary Shagan, Kazakhstan SSR. ABM components are not to be deployed at any other test ranges without prior agreement between the Parties.

Article V limits development and testing, as well as deployment, of certain types of ABM systems and components. Paragraph V(1) limits such activities to fixed, land-based ABM systems and components by prohibiting the development, testing or deployment of ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based. It is understood that the prohibitions on mobile ABM systems apply to ABM launchers and ABM radars which are not permanent fixed types.

Paragraph V(2) prohibits the development, testing or deployment of ABM launchers for launching more than one ABM interceptor missile at a time from each launcher; modification of deployed launchers to provide them with such a capability; and the development, testing or deployment of automatic or semi-automatic or other similar systems for rapid reload of ABM launchers. The Parties agree that this Article includes an obligation not to develop, test, or deploy ABM interceptor missiles with more than one independently guided warhead.

(3) Future ABM Systems

A potential problem dealt with by the Treaty is that which would be created if an ABM system were developed in the future which did not consist of interceptor missiles, launchers and radars. The Treaty would not permit the deployment of such a system or of components thereof capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles, launchers, or radars: Article II(1) defines an ABM system in terms of its function as "a system to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory," noting that such systems "currently" consist of ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers and ABM radars. Article III contains a prohibition on the deployment of ABM systems or their components except as specified therein, and it permits deployment only of ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, and ABM radars. Devices other than ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars could be used as adjuncts to an ABM system, provided that such devices were not capable of substituting for one or more of these components. Finally, in the course of the negotiations, the Parties specified that "In order to insure fulfillment of the obligation not to deploy ABM systems and their components except as provided in Article III of the Treaty, the Parties agree that in the event ABM systems based on other physical principles and including components capable of substituting for ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers, or ABM radars are created in the future, speeific limitations on such systems and their components would be subject to discussion in accordance with Article XIII and agreement in accordance with Article XIV of the Treaty." (As explained below, Article XIII calls for establishment of a Standing Consultative Commission, and Article XIV deals with amendments to the Treaty.)

(4) Modernization and Replacement

Article VII provides that, subject to the provisions of this Treaty, modernization and replacement of ABM systems or their components may be carried out. Modernization or replacement of present ABM systems or components is constrained by the various limitations and prohibitions in the Treaty. (See paragraph 2 of Article I, Article III, Article V, and Article VI.)

(5) Destruction and Dismantling

Article VIII provides that ABM systems or their components in excess of the numbers or outside the areas specified in the Treaty, as well as ABM systems or components prohibited by the Treaty, shall be destroyed or dismantled under agreed procedures within the shortest possible agreed period of time. Since no more than one ABM system deployment area for defense of ICBM silo launchers is permitted by Article III, this Article will apply, when the Treaty enters into force, to the ABM components previously under construction in the vicinity of Malmstrom Air Force Base in Montana.

B. OTHER RELATED MEASURES

(1) Constraints on Non-ABM Systems or Components

Article VI is designed to enhance assurance of the effectiveness of the basic limitations on ABM systems and their components provided by the Treaty. To this end, each Party undertakes in this Article (a) not to give missiles, launchers or radars, other than ABM interceptor missiles, ABM launchers and ABM radars, capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory; (b) not to test such non-ABM missiles, launchers and radars "in an ABM mode" and (c) not to deploy in the future radars for early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack except at locations along the periphery of its national territory and oriented outward.

The first of these undertakings would, for example, prohibit the modification of air-defense missiles (SAMs) to give them a capability against strategic ballistic missiles.

The undertaking not to test non-ABM interceptor missiles, launchers, and radars in an ABM mode subsequent to the date of signature of this Treaty would prohibit testing of non-ABM components for ABM purposes, but would not affect ABM testing of ABM components, or prevent testing of non-ABM components for non-ABM purposes.

With respect to the third of the undertakings in Article VI, it should be noted that the Treaty, while not intended to prohibit the further deployment of radars for early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack, requires their location along the periphery of each Party's national territory and oriented outward in order to minimize the possibility that they could contribute to an effective ABM defense of points in the interior.

Article VI also has the effect of prohibiting the future deployment in third countries of radars for early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack. Existing ballistic missile early-warning radars would not be affected. Article VI imposes no limitation on radars for national means of verification.

In recognition of the fact that phased-array radars with more than a certain potential, though deployed for non-ABM missions such as air defense or air traffic control, would have an inherent capacity for ABM use, the Parties agreed not to deploy phased-array radars having a potential exceeding three million watt-square meters, except as provided in Articles III, IV and VI of the Treaty and except for the purpose of tracking objects in outer space or for use as national technical means of verification. Deployment of non-ABM radars currently planned by the United States would not be affected.

(2) International Transfers

Article IX provides that, to assure the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty, each Party undertakes not to transfer to other States, and not to deploy outside its national territory, ABM systems or their components limited by the Treaty. The Parties understand that the first undertaking includes an obligation not to provide to other states technical descriptions or blueprints specially worked out for the construction of ABM systems and their components limited by the Treaty. In addition, the United States Delegation made clear that the provisions of this Article do not set a precedent for whatever provisions may be considered for a treaty on limiting strategic offensive arms, noting that the question of transfer of strategic offensive arms is a far more complex issue, which may require a different solution.

(3) Conflicting Obligations

Article X contains an undertaking by the Parties not to assume any international obligations which would conflict with the Treaty. The obligations in this Treaty are not inconsistent with any obligation of the United States under any international agreement.

C. VERIFICATION AND CONSULTATION

(1) Verification

Article XII relates to verification of compliance with the Treaty's provisions, which is to be accomplished by national technical means. Paragraph 1 states that each Party will use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law for purposes of providing assurance of compliance with provisions of the Treaty. It does not require changes from current operating practices and procedures with respect to systems which will be used as national technical means of verification.

The second paragraph of this Article provides that each Party agrees not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other which are operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of the Article. This provision would, for example, prohibit interference with a satellite in orbit used for verification of the Treaty.

Paragraph 3 contains an agreement not to use deliberate concealment measures which impede verification by national technical means. This paragraph expressly permits continuation of current construction, assembly, conversion, and overhaul practices.

(2) Standing Consultative Commission

Article XIII provides that the Parties shall establish promptly a Standing Consultative Commission (hereafter referred to as the Commission) to promote the objectives and to facilitate the implementation of the ABM Treaty. The Parties have further agreed to use the Commission to promote the objectives and implementation of the Interim Agreement. (See Article VI of the Interim Agreement.) The Commission will provide a consulting framework within which the Parties may consider various matters relating to the Treaty and the Interim Agreement. The Parties may also consider these matters in other channels.

A principal function of the Commission will be to consider questions of compliance with the obligations assumed under this Treaty and the Interim Agreement and also related situations which may be considered ambiguous. Each Party may voluntarily provide through the Commission information it considers necessary to assure confidence in compliance. Thus one Party might raise a question of compliance based on information gathered by national technical means of verification and the other Party could provide information to clarify the matter.

Attention was called above to the provisions in Article XII prohibiting intentional interference with national technical means of verification operating in accordance with its provisions. The Commission is charged by Article XIII with the responsibility to consider any questions of interference with such means. The Commission may also consider questions of concealment impeding verification by national means. The Commission may consider changes in the general

strategic situation which have a bearing on the provisions of the Treaty. Related to this is the Commission's authority to consider proposals to further increase the viability of the Treaty—such as agreed interpretations after the treaty has entered into force—and to consider proposals for amendment of the Treaty. (Amendments to the Treaty would have to be ratified pursuant to Articles XIV and XVI.) The Commission may also consider other appropriate measures, not specifically enumerated in Article XIII, aimed at further limiting strategic arms. Finally, through the Commission the Parties are to agree on procedures and dates for the implementation of Article VIII concerning destruction or dismantling of ABM systems or ABM components. (For corresponding responsibility of the Commission under the Interim Agrement, see section C of the discussion thereof.)

The second paragraph of Article XIII provides for the establishment of regulations for the Commission governing procedures, composition and other relevant matters. Such matters can be worked out early in the follow-on negotiations. Meanwhile, any consultation desired by either side under these Articles can be carried out by the Delegations during such negotiations or, when they are not in session, through other diplomatic channels.

The Commission is intended as a means to facilitate the implementation of the agreements and would not replace follow-on negotiations or use of other diplomatic channels.

D. DURATION, WITHDRAWAL AND FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS

Article XV provides that the Treaty shall be of unlimited duration, but contains a withdrawal clause of the type that has become standard in post-war arms control treaties. This clause provides that each Party, in exercising its national sovereignty, shall have the right to withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. Notice of such decision is to be given to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from the Treaty. Such notice is required to include a statement of the extraordinary events involved.

In this connection, the United States has stressed the unique relationship between limitations on offensive and defensive strategic arms. This interrelationship lends extraordinary importance to the undertaking in Article XI "to continue active negotiations for limitations on strategic offensive arms."

The special importance we attach to this relationship was reflected in the following formal statement relating to Article XI, which was made by the Head of the United States Delegation on May 9, 1972:

> The U.S. Delegation has stressed the importance the U.S. Government attaches to achieving agreement on more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms, following agreement on an ABM Treaty and on an Interim Agreement on certain measures with respect to the limitation of strategic offensive arms. The U.S. Delegation believes that an objective of the follow-on negotiations should be to constrain and reduce on a long-term basis threats to the survivability of our respective strategic retaliatory forces. The U.S.S.R. Delegation has also indicated that the objectives of SALT would remain unfulfilled without the achievement of an agreement providing for more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms. Both sides recognize that the initial agreements would be steps toward the achievement of more complete limitations on strategic arms. If an agreement providing for more complete strategic offensive arms limitations were not achieved within five years, U.S. supreme interests could be jeopardized. Should that occur, it would constitute a basis for withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. The U.S. does not wish to see such a situation occur, nor do we believe that the U.S.S.R. does. It is because we wish to prevent such a situation that we emphasize the importance the U.S. Government attaches to achievement of more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms. The U.S. Executive will inform the Congress, in connection with Congressional consideration of the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement, of this statement of the U.S. position.

E. OTHER PROVISIONS

Article XIV deals with amendments and review. Paragraph 1 provides that the Parties may propose amendments to the Treaty. Agreed amendments shall enter into force upon exchange of instruments of ratification. The second paragraph of Article XIV provides for formal review of the Treaty by the Parties at five year intervals. Paragraph 2 does not preclude agreement on proposed amendments of the Treaty during the first five years, or between formal reviews thereafter; it simply reflects recognition of the possibility of changes in the strategic relationship and the development of new strategic systems. These questions are also within the purview of the Standing Consultative Commission.

Article XVI and the final paragraph of the Treaty contain standard provisions on entry into force, registration pursuant to the United Nations Charter, and equal authenticity of the English and Russian language texts.

INTERIM AGREEMENT AND PROTOCOL

The Interim Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Certain Measures with respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (Interim Agreement), including a Protocol which is integral thereto, was signed on May 26, 1972. The Interim Agreement consists of a preamble and eight operative articles. In the course of the negotiations, agreement was reached on a number of interpretive matters related to the Interim Agreement. Enclosure 3 contains agreed interpretations and certain noteworthy unilateral statements.

This Agreement provides for a restriction of five years on strategic offensive missile launcher deployments pending negotiation of more complete limitations on strategic offensive arms. The main effects of the Interim Agreement will be that:

- —the aggregate number of fixed, land-based ICBM launchers and SLBM launcher will be limited;
- —starting construction of additional fixed, land-based ICBM launchers is prohibited;
- —the number of launchers for modern heavy ICBMs, such as the Soviet SS-9, will be limited to that number currently operational and under construction;
- —ceilings will be placed on the number of SLBM launchers and modern ballistic missile submarines operational on each side; and
- —up to the agreed ceilings, deployment of additional SLBM launchers above a specified number for each

Party requires an offsetting reduction of ICBM launchers of older types or SLBM launchers on older ballistic missile submarines.

In the first paragraph of the preamble of the Agreement the Parties express the conviction that the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement will contribute to the creation of more favorable conditions for active negotiation on limiting strategic arms and will improve international relations. In the second paragraph the Parties acknowledge the relationship between strategic offensive and defensive arms, and in the third they acknowledge their obligations under Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty to pursue disarmament negotiations.

A. ICBM LAUNCHERS

Article I of the Interim Agreement prohibits starting construction of additional fixed land-based ICBM launchers. While the text of Article I prescribes July 1, 1972 as the freeze date, the United States and the Soviet Union understand that, pending ratification and acceptance of the agreements, neither will take any action that will be prohibited thereby, in the absence of notification by either signatory of its intention not to proceed with ratification or approval.

This construction freeze covers all fixed land-based ICBM launchers, both silo and soft-pad, but does not include test and training ICBM launchers or mobile land-based ICBM launchers. Test and training launchers are, however, subject to other constraints. The United States has made clear to the Soviets that we would consider the deployment of operational land-mobile ICBM launchers during the period of the Interim Agreement to be inconsistent with the objectives of the Agreement. The Parties have agreed that the term ICBM includes any land-based strategic ballistic missile capable of ranges in excess of the shortest distance between the northeastern border of the continental United States and the northwestern border of the continental Soviet Union. Launchers for fractional orbital bombardment systems are considered to be ICBM launchers.

On May 26, 1972, the United States had 1,054 operational, land-based ICBM launchers and none under construction; on that date, the Soviet Union had a total of land-based ICBM launchers operational and under active construction estimated to be about 1,618. (ICBM launchers for testing and training purposes are excluded in each case.) Under the freeze, the Soviet Union may complete construction of ICBM launchers under active construction on May 26, 1972. While the Interim Agreement remains in effect, neither Party may start new construction (nor resume previously suspended construction) of fixed ICBM launchers except test and training launchers.

B. HEAVY ICBM LAUNCHERS

Article II provides that the Parties shall not convert land-based launchers for light, or older heavy, ICBMs into land-based launchers for modern heavy ICBMs, such as the Soviet SS-9. All currently operational ICBMs other than the SS-9 are either "light" (the United States Minuteman and the Soviet SS-11 and SS-13) or "older" ICBM launchers of types first deployed prior to 1964 (the United States Titan and the Soviet SS-7 and SS-8).

Article II would thus prohibit the conversion of a launcher for an SS-7, SS-8, SS-11 or SS-13 ICBM into a launcher for an SS-9 or any new modern heavy ICBM, and would similarly prohibit the conversion of a launcher for a Minuteman or Titan into a launcher for a modern heavy ICBM. The Parties agree that in the process of modernization and replacement the dimensions of land-based ICBM silo launchers will not be significantly increased, and that this means that any increase will not be greater than 10-15 per cent of the present dimensions. The United States has also made clear that it would consider any ICBM having a volume significantly greater than that of the largest light ICBM now operational on either side (which is the Soviet SS-11) to be a heavy ICBM.

C. SLBM LAUNCHERS AND MODERN BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES

Article III limits SLBM launchers and modern ballistic missile submarines to the numbers operational and under construction on May 26, 1972.

In addition, Article III and the Protocol permit launchers and submarines beyond 740 SLBM launchers on nuclear-powered submarines for the Soviet Union and 656 SLBM launchers on nuclear-powered submarines for the United States, subject to two constraints. First, additional SLBM launchers may become operational only as replacements for an equal number of ICBM launchers of types first deployed prior to 1964, or for launchers on older nuclear-powered submarines or for modern SLBM launchers on any type of submarine. Second, such substitution may not result in:

—the Soviet Union having operational more than 62 modern ballistic missile submarines or more than 950 SLBM launchers, including all SLBM launchers on nuclear-powered submarines and all modern SLBM launchers on any type of submarine;

—the United States having operational more than 44 modern ballistic missile submarines or more than 710 SLBM launchers.

Construction of replacement SLBM launchers up to the limits under the Protocol would require the dismantling or destruction, under agreed procedures, of an equal number of ICBM launchers of older types or of SLBM launchers on nuclear-powered submarines. Moreover, modern SLBM launchers deployed on any type of submarine would count against the total ceiling on SLBM launchers. Dismantling or destruction would be required to commence no later than the date on which sea trials of a replacement ballistic missile submarine begin and to be completed in the shortest possible agreed period of time. Thus the Soviets will have to begin dismantling older ICBM or SLBM launchers no later than when the 741st SLBM launcher on a nuclear-powered submarine enters sea trials. Dismantling or destruction as well as timely notification thereof, are to be carried out in accordance with procedures to be agreed upon in the Standing Consultative Commission.

D. TEST AND TRAINING LAUNCHERS

The Parties agree that the number of test and training launchers for ICBMs and SLBMs, including "modern heavy" ICBMs, shall not be increased significantly above the current number of test and training launchers for such missiles. It is understood that construction or conversion of ICBM launchers at test ranges shall be undertaken only for the purposes of testing and training. It is also understood that ICBM launchers for test and training purposes may be constructed at operational sites.

E. MODERNIZATION AND REPLACEMENT

Article IV provides that, subject to the provisions of the Interim Agreement, modernization and replacement of strategic ballistic missiles and launchers cov-

ered by the Interim Agreement may be undertaken. The conversion of current United States ICBM launchers to handle Minuteman III missiles, the conversion of current submarine launchers to handle Poseidon missiles, and the construction of new submarines as replacements for older submarines, are not prohibited by the Agreement.

F. OTHER PROVISIONS

Article V of the Interim Agreement contains the same provisions on verification as appear in Article XII of the ABM Treaty. Verification will be carried out by national technical means operating in accordance with generally recognized principles of international law. Interference with, or deliberate concealment from, such means is prohibited. Neither Party is required to change its current practices of construction, assembly, conversion, or overhaul.

Article VI provides that in order to promote the objectives and implementation of the Interim Agreement, the Parties shall use the Standing Consultative Commission to be established pursuant to Article XIII of the ABM Treaty.

In Article VII the Parties agree to continue active negotiation for limitations on strategic offensive arms. This Article also provides that the terms of this Interim Agreement will not prejudice the scope and terms of the limitations on strategic offensive arms which may be worked out in the subsequent negotiations. It is expected that these subsequent negotiations will start in the near future.

The first paragraph of Article VIII of the Interim Agreement provides that it shall enter into force upon the exchange of written notices of acceptance, simultaneously with the exchange of instruments of ratification of the ABM Treaty.

Paragraph 2 of Article VIII provides that the Interim Agreement shall remain in effect for five years, unless earlier replaced by agreement on more complete measures limiting strategic offensive arms.

The third paragraph of this Article provides each Party with a right, parallel to that contained in paragraph 2 of Article XV of the ABM Treaty, to withdraw upon six months' notice if such Party decides its supreme interests have been jeopardized by extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the Interim Agreement.

CONCLUSION

I believe the Treaty limiting antiballistic missile systems, together with the accompanying Interim Agreement and its Protocol constraining strategic offensive arms, constitute the most important step in arms limitation ever taken by this country. In these agreements, the two most powerful nations on earth are adopting measures designed to curb the deployment of strategic arms.

The Parties have protected their vital interests during the careful negotiation and elaboration of these agreements. We did not agree to anything adversely affecting the national interests of our Allies, who were regularly consulted during the negotiations. The Congress has been kept closely informed throughout the negotiations. Ambassador Smith and other Delegation members conducted a total of thirty executive session briefings for Congressional Committees.

These Agreements should help to improve Soviet-American relations and preserve and strengthen international security and world order. The entry into force of these measures should significantly advance the cause of peace in the world, and I hope that they can be brought into force as soon as practicable.

Respectfully submitted,
WILLIAM P. ROGERS

Enclosures:

1. The ABM Treaty.
2. The Interim Agreement and associated Protocol.
3. Agreed Interpretations and Unilateral Statements.

RETURN FROM THE SUMMIT. Home from summit talks in Moscow and visits to Iran and Poland, President and Mrs. Richard Nixon arrived at Andrews AFB, Maryland, June 1 and were immediately flown by helicopter to the Capitol, where Congress met in a joint night session to hear the President report on his journey. In his nationally televised appearance, Mr. Nixon said that he had no new announcements to make but that he wanted to amplify the announcements already made during his Moscow visits. Primarily, he referred to two basic documents: (1) Joint U.S.-Soviet Communiques; (2) Basic Principles of Mutual Relations between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. The latter document (published in its entirety on page 5) covers the spirit and the thrust of the historic Moscow summit conference. The first document (also reported verbatim, beginning on page 6) represents a point-by-point summary of agreements signed or reached in Moscow, ranging from Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT), to Incidents at Sea, to U.S.-Soviet Cooperation in Space. (Associated Press Photo)

ADDRESS

(Continued from Page 10)

anywhere in the world.

Speaking for the United States, I can say this. We covet no one else's territory, we seek no dominion over any other people, we seek the right to live in peace, not only for ourselves, but for all the peoples of this earth. Our power will only be used to keep the peace, never to break it, only to defend freedom, never to destroy it. No nation that does not threaten its neighbors has anything to fear from the United States.

Does America Want Peace?

Soviet citizens have often asked me, "Does America truly want peace?"

I believe that our actions answer that question far better than any words could do. If we did not want peace, we would have not reduced the size or our armed forces by a million men, by almost one-third, during the past three years. If we did not want peace, we would not have worked so hard at reaching an agreement on the limitation of nuclear arms, at achieving a settlement of Berlin, at maintaining peace in the Middle East, at establishing better relations with the Soviet Union, with the People's Republic of China, with other nations of the world.

Mrs. Nixon and I feel very fortunate to have had the opportunity to visit the Soviet Union, to get to know the people of the Soviet Union, friendly and hospitable, courageous and strong. Most Americans will never have a chance to visit the Soviet Union and most Soviet citizens will never have a chance to visit America. Most of you know our country only through what you read in your newspapers and what you hear and see on radio and television and motion pictures. This is only a part of the real America.

I would like to take this opportunity to try to convey to you something of what America is really like, not in terms of its scenic beauties, its great cities, its factories, its farms, or its highways, but in terms of its people.

Very Much Alike

In many ways, the people of our two countries are very much alike. Like the Soviet Union, ours is a large and diverse nation. Our people, like yours, are hard working. Like you, we Americans have a strong spirit of competition, but we also have a great love of music and poetry, of sports, and of humor. Above all, we, are an open, natural and friendly people. We love our country. We love our children. And we want for you and for your children the same peace and abundance that we want for ourselves and for our children.

We Americans are idealistists. We believe deeply in our system of government. We cherish our personal liberty. We would fight to defend it, if necessary, as we have done before. But we also believe deeply in the right of each nation to choose its own system. Therefore, however much we like our own system for ourselves, we have no desire to impose it on anyone else.

As we conclude this week of talks, there are certain fundamental premises of the American point of view which I believe deserve emphasis. In conducting these talks, it has not been our aim to divide up the world into spheres of influence, to establish a condominium, or in any way to conspire together against the interests of any other nation. Rather we have sought to construct a better framework of understanding between our two nations, to make progress in our bilateral relationship, to find ways of insuring that future frictions between us would never embroil our two nations, and therefore, the world, in war.

While ours are both great and powerful nations, the world is no longer dominated by two super powers. The world is a better and safer place, because its power and resources are more widely distributed.

Beyond this, since World War II, more than 70 new nations have come into being. We cannot have true peace unless they, and all nations, can feel that they share it.

Seeks Better Relations

America seeks better relations, not only with the Soviet Union, but with all nations. The only sound basis for a peaceful and progressive international order is sovereign equality and mutual respect. We believe in the right of each nation to chart its own course, to choose its own system, to go its own way, without interference from other nations.

As we look to the longer term, peace depends also on continued progress in the developing nations. Together with other advanced industrial countries, the United States and the Soviet Union share a two-fold responsibility in this regard.

On the one hand, to practice restraint in those activities, such as the supply of arms, that might endanger the peace of developing nations. And second, to assist them in their orderly economic and social development, without political interference.

Some of you may have heard an old story told in Russia of a traveler who was walking to another village. He knew the way, but not the distance. Finally he came upon a woodsman chopping wood by the side of the road and he asked the woodsman, "How long will it take to reach the village?"

The woodsman replied, "I don't know."

The traveler was angry, because he was sure the woodsman was from the village and therefore knew how far it was. And so he started off down the road again. After he had gone a few steps, the woodsman called out, "Stop. It will take you about 15 minutes."

The traveler turned and demanded, "Why didn't you tell me that in the first place?"

The woodsman replied, "Because then I didn't know the length of your stride."

Talks With Soviet Leaders

In our talks this weeks with the leaders of the Soviet Union, both sides have had a chance to measure the length of our strides toward peace and security. I believe that those strides have been substantial and that now we have well begun the long journey which will lead us to a new age in the relations between our two countries. It is important for both of our peoples that we continue those strides.

As our two countries learn to work together, our people will be able to get to know one another better. Greater cooperation can also mean a great deal in our daily lives. As we learn to cooperate in space, in health and the environment, in science and technology, our cooperation can help sick people get well. It can help industries produce more consumer goods. It can help all of us enjoy cleaner

air and water. It can increase our knowledge of the world around us.

As we expand our trade, each of our countries can buy more of the other's goods and market more of our own. As we gain experience with arms control, we can bring closer the day when further agreements can lessen the arms burden of our two nations and lessen the threat of war in the world.

Through all the pages of history, through all the centuries, the world's people have struggled to be free from fear, whether fear of the elements or fear of hunger or fear of their own rulers or fear of their neighbors in other countries. And yet, time and again, people have vanquished the source of one fear only to fall prey to another.

A World Free of Fear

Let our goal now be a world free of fear. A world in which nation will no longer prey upon nation, in which human energies will be turned away from production for war and toward more production for peace, away from conquest and toward invention, development, creation. A world in which together we can establish that peace which is more than the absence of war, which enables man to pursue those higher goals that the spirit yearns for.

Yesterday, I laid a wreath at the cemetery which commemorates the brave people who died during the Seige of Leningrad in World War II. At the cemetery, I saw the picture of a 12-year old girl. She was a beautiful child. Her name was Tanya. The pages of her diary tell the terrible story of war. In the simple words of a child, she wrote of the deaths of the members of her family. "Geine in December, Grannie in January. Lyosha then next. Then Uncle Vafya, then Uncle Lyosha, then Mama and then the Savizhevs." And then finally, these words, the last words in her diary, "All are dead. Only Tanya is left."

As we work toward a more peaceful world, let us think of Tanya and of the other Tanya's and their brothers and sisters everywhere. Let us do all that we can to insure that no other children will have to endure what Tanya did and that your children and ours, all the children of the world can live their full lives together in friendship and in peace.

Spasibo y Do Svidaniya.

INTERNATIONAL POLICY: Space Agreement

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS CONCERNING COOPERATION IN THE EXPLORATION AND USE OF OUTER SPACE FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;

Considering the role which the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. play in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes;

Striving for a further expansion of cooperation between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes;

Noting the positive cooperation which the parties have already experienced in this area;

Desiring to make the results of scientific research gained from the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes available for the benefit of the peoples of the two countries and of all peoples of the world;

Taking into consideration the provisions of the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, as well as the Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts, and the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space;

In accordance with the Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Exchanges and Cooperation in Scientific, Technical, Educational, Cultural, and Other Fields, signed April 11, 1972, and in order to develop further the principles of mutually beneficial cooperation between the two countries;

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

The parties will develop cooperation in the fields of space meteorology; study of the natural environment; exploration of near earth space, the moon and the planets; and space biology and medicine; and, in particular, will cooperate to take all appropriate measures to encourage and achieve the fulfillment of the Summary of Results of Discussion on Space Cooperation Between the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R. dated January 21, 1971.

ARTICLE 2

The parties will carry out such cooperation by means of mutual exchanges of scientific information and delegations, through meetings of scientists and specialists of both countries, and also in such other ways as may be mutually agreeed. Joint working groups may be created for the development and implementation of appropriate programs of cooperation.

ARTICLE 3

The Parties have agreed to carry out projects for developing compatible rendezvous and docking systems of United States and Soviet manned spacecraft and stations in order to enhance the safety of manned flights in space and to provide the opportunity for conducting joint scientific experiments in the future. It is planned that the first experimental flight to test these systems be conducted during 1975, envisaging the docking of a United States Apollo-type spacecraft and a Soviet Soyuz-type spacecraft with visits of astronauts in each other's spacecraft. The implementation of these projects will be carried out on the basis of principles and procedures which will be developed in accordance with the Summary of Results of the Meeting Between Representatives of the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration and the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences on the Question of Developing Compatible Systems for Rendezvous and Docking of Manned Spacecraft and Space Stations of the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. dated April 6, 1972.

(See SPACE, Page 30)

(Continued from Page 29)

ARTICLE 4

The parties will encourage international efforts to resolve problems of international law in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes with the aim of strengthening the legal order in space and further developing international space law and will cooperate in this field.

ARTICLE 5

The Parties may by mutual agreement determine other areas of cooperation in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes.

ARTICLE 6

This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature and shall remain in force for five years. It may be modified or extended by mutual agreement of the Parties.

DONE at Moscow this 24th day of May 1972 in duplicate, in the English and Russian languages, both equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

RICHARD NIXON

President of the United States

FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:

ALEXEI KOSYGIN

Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR

INTERNATIONAL POLICY: Space Agreement

STATEMENT FROM THE OFFICE OF THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY CONCERNING THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS CONCERNING COOPERATION IN THE EXPLORATION AND USE OF OUTER SPACE FOR PEACEFUL PURPOSES

Today's signing by the President and Chairman Kosygin of the Agreement Concerning Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for Peaceful Purposes, brings to fruition consultations between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. which commenced back in October, 1970. Today both parties commit themselves to a joint test rendezvous and docking mission scheduled for 1975. At that time the astronauts and cosmonauts will visit each other in their linked craft. Both parties regard this test mission as a first step in cooperation on future joint rendezvous, docking, rescue missions and joint experiments in space.

The first session of talks, with Dr. George Low, Deputy Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration heading up the United States side, and Academician M. V. Keldysh, President of the Soviet Academy of Science heading the Soviet side, were held on October 26-27 [1970] in Moscow. The final session of the talks preceding the Summit were held on April 4-6, 1972, when Mr. Low visited Moscow and consulted with the Soviet officials, headed by Academician V. A. Kotelnikov, Acting President of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. Working groups have also been meeting in Moscow and Houston since the opening of the discussions in 1970. The next meeting of the working groups is planned for July, 1972.

Under today's agreement both sides commit to the development of a complete project schedule, and to meeting that schedule. Arrangements will be made for the necessary contact and understanding between specialists engaged in developing and conducting the project. Training exercises will be conducted in country for the other country's flight crew and ground operations personnel.

A concerted effort will be made to arrive at a full agreement on the engineering aspects of the mission during the meeting of working groups in July. The intention of the parties to the agreement is that the people who will be directly participating in the flight operations of the test mission will be included in the working groups two years prior to the mission.

Each country's Control Center will be expected to control its own craft, but in the course of control on decisions affecting joint elements of the program—including countdown coordination—consultations will occur with the other country. There will be pre-planned contingency courses of action. Television downlink will be transmitted to the other country's control center, and voice communication between vehicle and ground will be available to the other country's control center on a pre-planned basis.

It is expected that, as a minimum, flight crews should be trained in the other country's language well enough to understand it and act in response during normal and contingency courses of action.

The Apollo command and service module and Saturn 1B required for the mission already exist and would not be utilized were it not for the mission. They have been constructed as back-up for current Apollo flights. Additional cost is estimated at about $250 million for the United States.

Project Directors for the mission have been designated in both countries. For the U.S. it is Glynn S. Lunney, Assistant to the Manager for Operational, Experiment, and Government Furnished Equipment, NASA Space Center; for the U.S.S.R. it is K. D. Bushuyev, Member, Soviet Academy.

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF THE SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON COOPERATION IN THE FIELDS OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics;

Recognizing that benefits can accrue to both countries from the development of cooperation in the fields of science and technology;

Wishing to assist in establishing closer and more regular cooperation between scientific and technical organizations of both countries;

Taking into consideration that such cooperation will serve to strengthen friendly relations between both countries;

In accordance with the Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Exchanges and Cooperation in Scientific, Technical, Educational, Cultural, and Other Fields, signed April 11, 1972, and in order to develop further the mutually beneficial cooperation between the two countries;

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

Both Parties pledged themselves to assist and develop scientific and technical cooperation between both countries on the basis of mutual benefit, equality and reciprocity.

ARTICLE 2

The main objective of this cooperation is to provide broad opportunities for both Parties to combine the efforts of their scientists and specialists in working on major problems, whose solution will promote the progress of science and technology for the benefit of both countries and of mankind.

ARTICLE 3

The forms of cooperation in science and technology may include the following:

a. Exchange of scientists and specialists;
b. Exchange of scientific and technical information and documentation;
c. Joint development and implementation of programs and projects in the fields of basic and applied sciences;
d. Joint research, development and testing, and exchange of research results and experience between scientific research institutions and organizations;
e. Organization of joint courses, conferences and symposia;
f. Rendering of help, as appropriate, on both sides in establishing contacts and arrangements between United States firms and Soviet enterprises where a mutual interest develops; and
g. Other forms of scientific and technical cooperation as may be mutually agreed.

ARTICLE 4

1. Pursuant to the aims of this Agreement, both Parties will, as appropriate, encourage and facilitate the establishment and development of direct contacts and cooperation between agencies, organizations and firms of both countries and the conclusion, as appropriate, of implementing agreements for particular cooperative activities engaged in under this Agreement.

2. Such agreements between agencies, organizations and enterprises will be concluded in accordance with the laws of both countries. Such agreements may cover the subjects of cooperation, organizations engaged in the implementation of projects and programs, the procedures which should be followed, and any other appropriate details.

ARTICLE 5

Unless otherwise provided in an implementing agreement, each Party or participating agency, organization or enterprise shall bear the costs of its participation and that of its personnel in cooperative activities engaged in under this Agreement, in accordance with existing laws in both countries.

ARTICLE 6

Nothing in this Agreement shall be interpreted to prejudice other agreements in the fields of science and technology concluded between the Parties.

ARTICLE 7

1. For the implementation of this Agreement there shall be established a U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Commission on Scientific and Technical Cooperation. Meetings will be convened not less than once a year in Washington and Moscow, alternately.

2. The Commission shall consider proposals for the development of cooperation in specific areas: prepare suggestions and recommendations, as appropriate, for the two Parties; develop and approve measures and programs for implementation of this Agreement; designate, as appropriate, the agencies, organizations or enterprises responsible for carrying out cooperative activities; and seek to assure

(See SCIENCE, Page 32)

SCIENCE

(Continued from Page 31)

their proper implementation.

3. The Executive Agent, which will be responsible for assuring the carrying out on its side of the Agreement, shall be, for the United States of America, the Office of Science and Technology in the Executive Office of the President and, for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the State Committee of the U.S.S.R. Council of Ministers for Science and Technology. The Joint Commission will consist of United States and Soviet delegations established on an equal basis of which the chairmen and members are to be designated by the respective Executive Agents with approval by the respective Parties. Regulations regarding the operation of the Commission shall be agreed by the chairmen.

4. To carry out its functions the Commission may create temporary or permanent joint subcommittees, councils or working groups.

5. During the period between meetings of the Commission additions or amendments may be made to already approved cooperative activities, as may be mutually agreed.

ARTICLE 8

1. This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature and shall remain in force for five years. It may be modified or extended by mutual agreement of the Parties.

2. The termination of this Agreement shall not affect the validity of agreements made hereunder between agencies, organizations and enterprises of both countries.

DONE at Moscow this 24th day of May, 1972, in duplicate, in the English and Russian languages, both equally authentic.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

WILLIAM P. ROGERS

The Secretary of State

FOR THE CHAIRMAN OF THE STATE COMMITTEE FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY:

V. A. KIRILLIN

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE U.S.S.R. ON THE PREVENTION OF INCIDENTS ON AND OVER THE HIGH SEAS

The Agreement, to be known as the "Washington-Moscow Naval Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents on and over the Hig Seas," as concluded in May is the first high-level military-to-military Agreement concluded between the Soviet Union and the United States since World War II. It reflects the desire of both countries to enhance the safety of operations of their armed forces when in the proximity of one another on and over the high seas, and represents the first attempt to establish direct communication and ongoing consultations between the two largest navies in the world. Secretary John W. Warner signed the Agreement on behalf of the United States Government and Fleet Admiral S. G. Gorshkov, Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy and Deputy Minister of Defense, signed on behalf of the Soviet Government.

The Summit negotiations on the Agreement were preceded by two rounds of talks between representatives of the Soviet and American navies. The first round was held in Moscow, October 12-22, 1971; the second in Washington, D.C., May 4-17, 1972. Secretary of the Navy Warner headed the U.S. Delegation and Fleet Admiral Vladimir Kasatonov headed the Soviet Delegation.

The Agreement is aimed at reducing the possibility of an accident between military units on or over the high seas which could lead to an unintended confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. The Agreement applies only to ships of the respective armed forces and military aircraft. For example it does not apply to merchant ships and fishing vessels. The Agreement basically reaffirms and in no way alters the Rules of the Road (The International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea).

Military commanders will henceforth be required to increase the use of signals, to refrain from making simulated attacks, and to use greater caution and prudence in approaching military units of the other party. Most significant is the direction to keep "well clear" of ships launching and recovering aircraft. Representatives of the two navies will meet at least annually to consult on the implementation of the Agreement, thus guaranteeing a continuation of the navy-to-navy exchange which began with the talks. Further, the Agreement provides a channel for exchanging information regarding alleged incidents through naval attaches.

STATEMENT BY THE WHITE HOUSE PRESS SECRETARY FOLLOWING THE SIGNING OF THE STRATEGIC ARMS LIMITATION AGREEMENT

The President believes that this agreement limiting strategic arms signed today is an historic event in every sense of the word. It is the first time that two major powers have achieved this kind of understanding affecting their vital security.

The President believes that this agreement is not only to the advantage of both the countries whose leaders signed it today, but to the entire world. This is an agreement that enhances the security of both sides. It is a major contribution to U.S.-Soviet bilateral relations, and it should serve the interests of the peoples of the world.

The President believes that both countries plan to build on this solid foundation by continuing their discussion on arms limitation and seeking to make new agreements.

President Nixon is deeply gratified that now, for the first time since the advent of nuclear weapons a generation ago, the two most powerful nations in the world have taken the lead in a direction away from wasteful, dangerous, and self-perpetuating competition in armaments and toward a mutual restraint on weapons systems.

The President expressed special appreciation to the members of the U.S. SALT delegation, and also to the negotiators on the Soviet side as well. He expressed his appreciation for their intensive efforts over the past 30 months leading up to the completed treaty and interim agreement.

It is the President's intention to press ahead as rapidly as practical in building on the foundation laid down by the limitation of offensive weapons, and more comprehensive agreements across the whole range of issues confronting our two countries today.

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